Aspect in St'át'imcets future expressions[*]

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St'át'imcets has two ways of expressing future: klh and cuz'. An interesting contrast arises in the context of making an offer, where kelh is felicitous, but not cuz'. This paper addresses the question of how to differentiate the two meanings of the different future morphemes. The two St'át'imcets future morphemes pattern with the English will and be going to. I adopt Copley's (2002) analysis of the behaviour of the two English futures in the offer context. Copley accounts for the difference between English will and be going to by appealing to their aspectual properties. She claims be going to involves a progressive-like aspectual operator taking scope over the future modal. On the other hand, will is analysed as a bare (aspectless) future. Based on data collected in primary fieldwork, I provide an account of future expressions in St'át'imcets and, at the same time, test the cross-linguistic applicability of Copley's hypothesis.

1   Introduction

This paper discusses the semantic difference between two future expressions, *kelh* and *cuz'*, in St'át'imcets, a Salish language spoken in the British Columbia Interior. In most contexts, the future may be expressed by using either *kelh* or *cuz'*. However, a subtle difference is apparent in native speaker responses to the use of one morpheme as opposed to the other. Specifically, at least one native speaker prefers to use *cuz'* when "you know for sure" the proposition is going to happen. Thus, *cuz'* is associated with certainty in a way that *kelh* is not. I predict, therefore, that contexts that are uncertain will permit *kelh* and prohibit *cuz'*, while contexts that require certainty will permit *cuz'* and prohibit *kelh*. This prediction is supported in the data. A second difference between the two ways of expressing the future is that *kelh* may be used to make an offer, while *cuz'* cannot. Thirdly, *cuz'* may occur with the auxiliary *plan* ("already"), while *kelh* cannot. Thus, there is a

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semantic distinction between *kelh* and *cuz'* that has not previously been considered in the literature.

Like St'át'imcets, English has two ways of expressing the future: *will* and *be going to*. Copley (2002) has argued that these two expressions are future modals distinguishable on the basis of their aspectual base. Under Copley's analysis, *be going to* has a progressive-like aspectual operator which takes scope over the future modal. *Will* is ambiguous between an aspectless reading and a generic reading, whereby a generic-like operator takes scope over the future modal.

The purpose of this paper is to consider whether the two St'át'imcets futures can be similarly distinguished on the basis of aspect. I ultimately conclude they do indeed differ aspectually, as predicted by Copley's analysis of English.

The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides some background to the St'át'imcets data; Section 3 introduces the offer puzzle; Section 4 outlines Copley's analysis of English *will* and *be going to*; Section 5 discusses how Copley's analysis extends to St'á'timcets; Section 6 discusses some further predictions raised by Copley's analysis; and Section 7 concludes.

2   Background

St'át'imcets has two ways of expressing the future: *kelh* and *cuz'*.[1] *Cuz'* is an auxiliary verb that attracts person marking clitics.

(1)   Cúz-lhkan   pun[2]
       Fut-1sg.subj   find
       "I am going to find it"

Kelh is a second position clitic which always occurs after the first element of the clause. Both *kelh* and *cuz'* are used to express the future.

(2)   a.   Nás-kan   kelh kukw
             go.to-1sg.subj fut cook
             "I will go cook"
             (LT: 2007-02-01)

       b.   Cúz'-lhkan   nas   kukw
             fut-1sg.subj   go.to cook

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[1] The motion verb *nas*, which can be used as an aspectual auxiliary, can also result in a future interpretation, but will not be discussed in this paper.

[2] Data are presented in the practical orthography of the language developed by Van Eijk. The following abbreviations will be used throughout: *1* = first person; *2* = second person; *3* = third person; *deic* = deictic; *deon* = deontic; *det* = determiner; *evid* = evidential; *fut* = future; *imp* = imperfective; *intr* = autonomous intransitiver; *mid* = middle intransitivizer; *nom* = nominalizer; *poss* = possession; *red* = redirective applicative; *sg* = singular; *subj* = subject; *subjn* = subjunctive; *tr* = transitivizer.

"I am going to go cook"
(LT: 2007-02-01)

Kelh has been analysed as being equivalent to English *WOLL* (Matthewson, in press). *WOLL* is the core element of meaning shared by English *will* and *would* and involves temporal ordering and, possibly, modality. No analysis of *cuz'* has been proposed.

3   The offer puzzle

While both *kelh* and *cuz'* can be used to express the future, only *kelh* can be used in the context of making an offer:

(3)   Context: You are going to a potluck tomorrow night. You are
                         sitting with a bunch of other people who will also be
                         going to the potluck. You haven't yet decided what
                         you are going to bring to the potluck. The host says:
                         "No one is going to cook a fish for dinner tomorrow.
                         Would someone like to cook a fish?"

a.   kúkw-lhkan   kelh ku   s-ts'úqwaz'   ✓offer
      cook-1sg.subj   fut   det   nom-fish
      "I will cook a fish"

b.   cúz'-lhkan   kukw   ku s-ts'úqwaz'   # offer
      fut-1sg   cook   det nom-fish
      "I am going to cook a fish"

(4)   Context: A friend is organizing a charity drive whereby we
                         will collect donations from people in exchange for
                         hiking up a mountain. She asks me if I would like to
                         participate in the climb.

a.   xát'-em-lhkan   kelh ti s-qwém-a
      climb-mid-1sg.subj   fut   det nom-mountain-det
      "I will climb the mountain"   ✓offer

b.   cúz'-lhkan   xát'-em   ti s-q̓wém-a
      fut-1sg.subj   climb-mid   det nom-mountain-det
      "I am going to climb the mountain"   # offer

      Speaker's Comment: "I'm not offering, but telling her I'll
      climb the mountain."

The distinction between future markers in St'át'imcets is consistent with the distinction previously noted in Copley (2002) between English *will* and *be*

going to. Specifically, she noted that (5a) is an appropriate billboard advertisement, while (5b) is not.

(5) a. We will change your oil in Madera.   ✓offer
     b. We are going to change your oil in Madera.   # offer
                                              (Copley 2002: (158))

Copley argues that the billboard advertisement is an offer with a covert antecedent. That is, it contains an unpronounced *"If you want..."* antecedent:

(6) a. ·(*If you want us to change your oil in Madera,*) we will change your oil in Madera.   ✓offer

     b. (*If you want us to change your oil in Madera,*) we are going to change your oil in Madera.   # offer
                                              (Copley 2002: (163))

Copley argues that *will* can be used to make an offer and *be going to* cannot because of the difference in their aspect.

4   Copley's analysis of English

Copley argues that *will* and *be going to* both involve a future modal, but differ in terms of their aspect. In *be going to*, a progressive-like operator takes scope over the future modal (the "progressive-like future"). On the other hand, *will* is ambiguous between two readings: an aspectless reading in which no aspectual operator takes scope over the future modal (the "bare future"), and a generic reading in which a generic-like operator takes scope over the future modal. For the purposes of this paper, I focus on the progressive-like future and the bare future, whose syntactic structures are given below, and assuming Copley's (2002) semantics of "direction".

(7)   a. Progressive-like future   b. Bare future

(Copley 2002: (113) and (114)))

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| c.	*Direction:*	An entity d directs a proposition p in w at t iff: $\forall$w', d has the same abilities in w' as in w: [$\forall$w'' metaphysically accessible from w' at t and consistent with d's commitments in w' at t: [$\forall$w''' metaphysically accessible from w at t:[$\exists$t' > t: [p(w'')(t')] $\Leftrightarrow$ [$\exists$t'': > t: [p(w''')(t')]]]]]

<div align="right">(Copley 2002: (159))</div>

Future expressions vary in their semantic composition in terms of what worlds they quantify over.

4.1   The pragmatics of offering

Copley argues that the aspectual component of *will* is compatible with the pragmatics of offering, while the aspectual component of *be going to* is not. Recall that, for Copley, an offer contains an elided "*If you want...*" antecedent. To count as an offer, the speaker must be in a position to direct whether or not the eventuality of the consequent, the q-eventuality, will hold, assuming the semantics for direction given in (7c) above. That is, the speaker must be in a position to assert both "*If you want q, will q*" and "*If you don't want q, not q*".

The bare future, *will*, quantifies over worlds compatible with what the hearer wants at the utterance time (t). That is, it quantifies over world, time pairs at a *point*, as shown in the following schematic:

(8)   *Bare future*

Thus, the speaker can assess at the utterance time whether the offer is consistent with the hearer's desires.

Alternatively, the progressive-like future quantifies over world, time pairs over an *interval* surrounding the utterance time and, therefore, may include both worlds that are compatible with what the hearer wants (p worlds) and those that are not compatible with what the hearer wants (not p worlds).

(9) *Progressive-like future*

Because the progressive-like future quantifies over an interval, it is incompatible with offering. The future modal requires that all worlds branching off be compatible with what the hearer wants. However, the progressive-like operator forces the sentence to be evaluated over an interval, t', rather than at a point in time. At the utterance time, the hearer may want not q. However, the hearer may change their mind so that, some time after t but within t', they do want q. The ability of the interval t' to contain both worlds in which the hearer wants q and worlds in which the hearer does not want q renders *be going to* incompatible with offering.

4.2   Present temporal input

Copley finds further support for the aspectual distinction between *will* and *be going to* in present temporal input contexts.   In order to be felicitous in a present temporal input context, a predicate must possess the Subinterval Property (SIP). Copley adopts Dowty's (1979) definition of the SIP:

(10) *Subinterval Property*
A predicate p of times has the subinterval property if and only if for all times t, and for all subintervals t' of t, the truth of p(t) entails the truth of p(t').

<div align="right">(Copley 2002: p. 18)</div>

Copley argues that the progressive-like future has the subinterval property (i.e., is +SIP) by virtue of having a high +SIP predicate, SOME. Conversely, because the bare future does not have a +SIP predicate, it is predicted to be – SIP.
Copley further argues that only +SIP predicates are felicitous in a present temporal input context. She proposes a constraint to rule out the –SIP predication of *now* as follows:

(11)   *Present –SIP Constraint*
        For all worlds w, for –SIP predicates of times P, P(*now*) is undefined.
                                                                    (Copley 2002: (5))

Therefore, if the bare future is –SIP, then it should be infelicitous in present temporal input contexts by virtue of the Present –SIP Constraint. Conversely, if *be going to* is +SIP, then it should be felicitous in the same context. Copley shows that this prediction is borne out in two present temporal input contexts: the "Oh look!" context, and the "I can't believe …" context.
        The "oh look" context requires a +SIP predicate because it forces the speaker and hearer to evaluate the situation based on evidence available in the present moment.

(12)   a.   Oh look! He's going to jump!
        b.   # Oh look! He will jump!

                                                                    (Copley 2002: (141))

As predicted, *be going to* is felicitous in "oh look!" contexts while *will* is not.
        Similarly, the "I can't believe…" context requires a +SIP predicate because, under its idiomatic reading, the truth of the proposition is presupposed. The idiomatic reading does not doubt the truth of the proposition, it merely expresses surprise. The presupposition must be evaluated in the present moment, and therefore, -SIP predicates should be infelicitous in these contexts.

(13)   a.   I can't believe you are going to get married next week!
        b.   I can't believe you will get married next week!   #idiomatic
                                                                    (Copley 2002: (149))

As predicted, *be going to* is felicitous in "I can't believe…" contexts while *will* is not.
        The present temporal input data show that *will* is –SIP and *be going to* is +SIP. The data support Copley's claim that *will* and *be going to* differ in terms of their aspect. In present temporal input contexts, the progressive-like future *be going to* is felicitous and the bare future *will* is not. In offer contexts, the progressive-like future *be going to* is ruled out because it quantifies over an interval rather than a period, and is thus incompatible with the pragmatics of making an offer. The bare future *will*, on the other hand, is felicitous in offer contexts, because it quantifies over a point.

5   Application of Copley's analysis to St'át'imcets

        As shown in section 3 above, St'át'imcets *kelh* is felicitous in offer contexts while *cuz'* is not. *Kelh* behaves like the bare future, which quantifies over a point. *Cuz'* behaves like the progressive-like future, which quantifies

over an interval.   However, independent support for this claim cannot be motivated on the basis of present temporal input contexts.

St'át'imcets is a superficially tenseless language. (Matthewson, 2003, in press). Matthewson (in press) claims that St'át'imcets has a null tense morpheme which can be interpreted in either the present tense or the past tense, depending on the context.   Unlike English, St'át'imcets activity predicates can be interpreted in the present tense, without needing to be in the imperfective.

(14)   sáy'sez'   kw-s   Helen
        play   *det-nom Helen*
        "Helen played / <u>is</u> play<u>ing</u> " (imperfective required in English present)
                                                        (Matthewson, 2003: (26))

For English activity predicates, the present tense requires the imperfective, as shown in the gloss of (14). Matthewson adopts Bennett and Partee's (1978) account for the English data whereby the utterance time is an instantaneous event and only +SIP predicates can hold at the utterance time without needing to be in the imperfective.

Matthewson argues that the distinction between English and St'át'imcets results from St'át'imcets's lack of an overt present tense morpheme that is distinct from the past.[3] Without a present tense morpheme, there is nothing which would require an instantaneous moment. The St'át'imcets activity predicates, which do not possess the subinterval property, can "'fit into' a <u>larger present-time interval</u>, and therefore do not need to be in the imperfective:[4]" (Matthewson, 2003: p. 7) Thus, the presence or absence of the subinterval property should have no bearing on what predicate can be used in present temporal inputs.

Matthewson's analysis predicts that both *kelh* and *cuz'* should be felicitous in present temporal input contexts. This prediction is borne out in the data. For example, the data in (15) involves a present temporal input context, and both future expressions are felicitous.

(15)   Context: We are out for a walk along a mountain path. You look up and see a big rock, teetering on the edge. It's going to fall in front of us. I don't see the rock and you want to warn me it's about to fall.

        a.   t'al-lec,   cuz' k'a   zil[5]   ka   ti   xzúm-a k'ét'a
                  stop-intr   fut evid   roll deon   det big-det rock
                  "Stop, that big rock is going to roll (down)!"

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[3] Both use the null tense morpheme, Ø.

[4] I note that this is a controversial claim.

[5] In Van Eijk's dictionary, the word for "roll" is *xelq*.

b.   t'al-lec,   zil kelh k'a láti7 ti xzúm-a k'ét'a
           stop-intr   roll fut   evid   deic   det big-det rock
           "Stop, that big rock is going to roll (down)!"

Thus, the present temporal input tests used by Copley to independently motivate a distinction between *will* and *be going to* are not available in St'át'imcets. Instead, a language internal test must be uncovered.

     One potential language internal test that has been suggested[6] is the ability to co-occur with the aspectual auxiliary *lan* ("already"). Davis (in prep.) suggests that *lan* has the effect of foregrounding the last stage of an event:

(16)   ...

        Initial state   final state
                                  lan

                       (adapted from Davis, in prep: ch18 (40))

The effect of *lan* can be seen in the following data.

(17)   a.   Káohaomlhkan ...
               "I went to meet the train...."

      b. (i)   ... t'iq aylh ta nsem7áma.
                "... Then my wife arrived."

          (ii)   ... Plan aylh t'iq ta nsem7áma.[7]
                 "... My wife had already arrived."
                          (Davis, in prep: ch18 (39))

In the reading in 17(b)(i), the speaker arrived to meet the train before the wife arrived. In 17(b)(ii), however, the wife arrived before the speaker met the train. Here, *lan* has the effect of forcing the wife's arrival to precede the speaker's arrival. Thus, *lan* has the effect of zooming "in on the final stage of the event, putting all the rest of the event into the background": Davis (in prep. Ch.18 p. 11).

     A distinction exists between *kelh* and *cuz'* in terms of their ability to co-occur with *lan*. Specifically, *cuz'* can occur with *lan* and retain its future meaning, while *kelh* cannot.

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[6] by Henry Davis in personal communication.

[7] *lan* is pronounced *plan* in Upper St'át'imcets.

(18)　Context:　　　You are at a party with Joel when people start singing. You ask Joel to sing a song. He agrees. Before he starts to sing, I come up to you and suggest that you ask Joel to sing a song. You want to tell me that he's already going to sing (he just hasn't started yet).

a.　　lan　　wa7　cuz'　ít'-em
already imp　fut　sing-mid.
"He's already going to sing."

b.　　lan　　kelh　wa7　ít'-em
already fut　imp sing-mid
* "He's already going to sing"
"He may be singing already"

As shown above, *cuz'* retains its future reading when paired with *lan*, while *kelh* does not appear to retain its future meaning in the same context. Further evidence of this distinction is shown in the data in (19):

(19)　Context:　　　Your friend calls and invites you to bingo tonight. You agree to go. Before you leave, your niece phones and invites you to bingo as well. You want to tell her that you are already going to bingo.

a.　　lán-lhkan　　　　t'u7　cuz'　nas ku bingo
already-1sg.subj just　fut　　go det bingo
"I am already going to go to bingo"

b.　* lán-lhkan　　　　kelh t'u7 nas ku　bingo
already-1sg.subj fut　just　go　det bingo

c.　* lán-lhkan　　　　t'u7 kelh　nas　ku bingo
already-1sg.subj just　fut　　go　　det bingo

The same distinction exists in English. The bare future *will* cannot co-occur with *already*, but the progressive-like future *be going to* can.

(20)　a.　　I am already going to go to bingo.
　　　b.　# I will already go to bingo.

The bare future may only occur with *already* if it is marked for the imperfective.

(21)　　　　I will already be going to bingo.

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However, (21) does not mean that the act of going to bingo has been planned by the utterance time. It means that, at some time in the future, the act of going to bingo will be in progress.

In terms of the ability to co-occur with *lan/already*, the distinction between the bare future and the progressive-like future in both languages may result from a requirement that *lan/already* require quantification over worlds.

English *already* has been analyzed as requiring an interval. Michaelis (1996, p. 485) argues that *already* not only encodes the existence of a given state of affairs (the "*already*-state") at the reference time, but it presupposes that the inception of this state is anterior to an interval of a specific type (the "Reference Interval"). The Reference Interval contains a state of the same type as the *already*-state. The *already*-state must be linked to the reference time, but the Reference Interval itself need not. Crucially, it must be subsequent to the *already*-state. She summarizes this relationship in the following schema:

(22)

(adapted from Michaelis 1996: (15))

(23)   I am already going to go to bingo.

The sentence in (23) will be true if, at the reference time (here, the Utterance Time), the speaker has already made the decision to go to bingo. The reference interval, the interval in which the decision to go to bingo holds, must temporally follow the original decision. Importantly, *already* requires an assessment over an interval, the reference interval, in order to determine whether the *already*-state holds during that interval. Thus, it is compatible with the progressive-like future, which also quantifies over world, time pairs over an interval, but is incompatible with the bare future, which quantifies over world, time pairs at a point.

The *lan* data provide independent support for Copley's analysis that the bare future and the progressive-like future differ aspectually. *Lan* necessarily

involves an interval, and thus is compatible with the *cuz'* because it quantifies over an interval: the progressive-like future. *Kelh* is not compatible with *lan* because it quantifies over a point. Conversely, *kelh* is compatible with the pragmatics of making an offer precisely because it quantifies over a point, whereas *cuz'* is not compatible with offering because it quantifies over an interval.

6   Further questions

Copley argues that *will* and *be going to* differ aspectually. *Will* has no aspectual operator taking scope over the future modal, while *be going to* involves a progressive-like operator taking scope over the future modal. This analysis raises a number of questions and makes some very significant predictions, which require further research.

6.1   Compositionality

This analysis predicts that, in some languages, the combination of future marker and progressive operator might be morphologically visible. Reis Silva (2006) has argued that Blackfoot, an Algonquian language spoken in Southern Alberta, may be one such language. Blackfoot also has two future expressions, *áak* and *áyaak*. *Áak* behaves like *kelh* and *will* in that it is felicitous in offer contexts. Conversely, *áyaak* behaves like *cuz'* and *be going to* in that it cannot be used to make an offer.

(24)   Context: A party is already planned and the host is looking for
                          a volunteer to cook.

    a.   Kammistenikii   nistoo   nit**áak**sojoosi
          kamm-isteniki   nistoo   nit-**áak**-ojoosi
          if-want   1sg   1sg-fut-cook
          "If you wish, I will cook."   ✓offer

    b.   Kammistenikii   nistoo   nit**áyaak**sojoosi
          kamm-isteniki   nistoo   nit-**áyaak**-ojoosi
          if-want   1sg   1sg-fut-cook
          "If you wish, I am going to cook."   #offer
                               (adapted from Reis Silva, 2006: (4))

Reis Silva argues, following Frantz (1991), that *áyaak* is morphologically composed of the future expression *áak* plus the durative marker *a-*[8]. This is further evidence in favour of Copley's analysis of the distinction between aspectual components of future markers: specifically, it is evidence in favour

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[8] The durative is not a progressive marker, but is likely an imperfective marker. See Dunham (2007) for further discussion.

of the fact that the progressive-like future is composed of a future modal and a progressive-like operator.

In St'át'imcets, *cuz'* is morpho-syntactically in the same class as other aspectual operators, e.g. *wa7* and *plan*. On the other hand, *kelh* is in the same class as other modals, among other things, but that are not aspectual. This may suggest that *cuz'* has an aspectual component that *kelh* lacks.

6.2 Progressive vs. imperfective operators

In Copley's original analysis, *be going to* comprises a progressive operator (as opposed to a progressive-*like* operator) taking scope over the future modal. It is unclear how that analysis would treat a language with no morphologically realized progressive operator. St'át'imcets has an imperfective operator, realized as the aspectual auxiliary *wa7*, but does not appear to have a progressive. It is unclear whether Copley's analysis forces every language to have a (covert) progressive operator, or whether the progressive-like operator is really an imperfective operator in languages with no overt progressive. In any event, Copley has subsequently relabeled her operator the "progressive-*like*" operator (see Copley, to appear), presumably in order to avoid this type of issue.

6.3 Co-occurrence of future expressions

The St'át'imcets futures pattern in a way that is distinct from the English futures. That is, *kelh* and *cuz'* can co-occur and seemingly both retain their future meanings. *Will* and *be going to* cannot.

(25) a.   I will jump.
      b.   I am going to jump.
      c.   I will be going to jump.

In (25a) and (25b), *will* and *be going to* have a future reading. However, where both occur, as in (25c), *will* continues to contribute a future meaning, however, *be going to* is limited to marking movement or direction, as exemplified in (26):

(26) a.   I will be going [over there] to jump.
      b.   I will be going [to John's house] to jump [on his trampoline].
      c. ?? I will be going to jump [tomorrow].

Importantly, *be going to* does not seem to retain its future meaning when combined with *will* in a sentence.

Moreover, a sentence with both *will* and *be going to* cannot be used to make an offer:

(27) Context: You are at your grandson's birthday. He hurt his
                      hand, and can't cut the cake after blowing out the
                      candles. You watch him try to manoeuver the knife,
                      but see that he is having trouble. You want to offer
                      to cut the cake for him.

   a.   I will cut the cake.   ✓offer
   b.   I am going to cut the cake.   # offer
   c.   ? I will be going to cut the cake.   # offer

Thus, in English, it appears that when both future markers co-occur, *be going
to* loses its future meaning and *will* loses its ability to be felicitous in offer
contexts.
      Conversely, St'at'imcets *cuz'* and *kelh* appear to be able to co-occur
and the resulting sentence is still a valid offer:

(28) Context: You are at your grandson's birthday. He hurt his
                      hand, and can't cut the cake after blowing out the
                      candles. You watch him try to manoeuver the knife,
                      but see that he is having trouble. You want to offer
                      to cut the cake for him.

   a.   cúz'-lhkan   ník'-in' ti   kíks-tsw-a
            fut-1sg.subj cut-tr det cake-2poss-det
            "I am going to cut the cake"   # offer

            Speaker's comment: it's grammatical, but you're not
            volunteering to cut the cake. You're telling him.

   b.   nik'-ín'-lhkan   kelh ti   kíks-tsw-a
            cut-tr-1sg.subj fut   det cake-2poss-det
            "I will cut the cake"   ✓offer

            Speaker's comment: you are volunteering to cut the cake

   c.   cúz'-lhkan   kelh ník'-in' ti   k'iks-tsw-a
            fut-1sg.subj fut   cut-tr det cake-2poss-det
            "I will cut the cake"   ✓offer

(29) Context: You are sitting with some friends in your apartment.
                      You all want to go to bingo, but your niece, who was
                      supposed to drive, is running late. You want to offer
                      to drive everyone to bingo.

   a.   cúz'-lhkan   tqálk'-em   lh-xat'-min'-ál'ap
            fut-1sg.subj drive-intr if-want-red-2pl.sbjn

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"I am going to drive if you want me to"   # offer

LT: it's grammatical, but you're not volunteering

b.   tqálk'-em-lhkan   kelh lh-xat'-min'-ál'ap
      drive-intr-1sg.subj   fut   if-want-red-2pl.sbjn
      "I will drive if you want me to"   ✓offer

c.   cáz'-lhkan   kelh tqálk'-em   lh-xat'-min'-ál'ap
      fut-1sg.subj   fut   drive-intr   if-want-red-2pl.sbjn
  .   "I am going to drive, if you want me to"   ✓offer

Thus, when St'át'imcets futures co-occur, it appears that *kelh* retains its ability to be felicitous in an offer context. It is unclear what status *cuz'* has when it co-occurs with *kelh*.

At this point, I have no answer to this question. One possibility may be that the difference between English and St'át'imcets arises because of the syntactic types of the future expressions. In English, both *will* and *be going to* are auxiliaries that precede the main verb. Perhaps there is some constraint on the co-occurrence of like syntactic elements that prohibits the co-occurrence of *will* and *be going to*.[9] Such a constraint would not apply In St'át'imcets, because *cuz'* is an auxiliary but *kelh* is a second position clitic.

Another alternative may be that the difference arises because *cuz'* and *be going to* make use of a different aspectual operator. As noted above, *be going to* is analyzed as a progressive operator taking scope over the future modal. Because St'át'imcets has no progressive operator, it is presumed that some other operator, potentially the imperfective, is taking scope over the future modal in *cuz'*. Perhaps the difference resulting from co-occurrence in English versus St'át'imcets can be attributed to the difference between a progressive operator as opposed to an imperfective operator. However, it is not at all clear to me what that difference might be.

The Blackfoot data is unhelpful in attempting to determine if either of the (very preliminary) ideas are on the right track. Blackfoot prohibits the co-occurrence of *áak* and *áyaak*.[10] If Frantz (1991) and Reis Silva (2006) are correct that *áyaak* is composed of *áak* plus the durative, then we would predict that *aak* could not be added to a sentence with *áyaak*. In *áyaak*, the preverbal position for tense will already be filled and there would be no place for the uncombined *aak* to surface. While this may lend support for the idea that the co-occurrence restrictions are syntactic, the co-occurrence in Blackfoot may be entirely syntactic and have nothing to say about aspect whatsoever. As such, further research is required before we can know how all of these remaining pieces fit together.

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[9] The constraint would only affect aspectual *be going to*. Directional *be going to* is still permitted, as shown in (26c).

[10] Reis Silva, personal communication.

7   Conclusion

The St'át'imcets futures, *kelh* and *cuz'* , pattern as predicted by Copley's analysis. *Kelh* patterns with Copley's bare future, and is felicitous in offer contexts. *Cuz'* patterns with Copley's progressive-like future, and is incompatible with the pragmatics of offering. The data involving *lan* offer independent evidence favouring the aspectual distinction between *kelh* and *cuz'*. Though not discussed in Copley (2002), the inability of the bare future to co-occur with *already* holds in English as well as in St'át'imcets. Thus, St'át'imcets provides further evidence in favour of Copley's analysis of the semantics of the future.

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