St’átl’ímcets has two ways of expressing future: klh and cuz'. An interesting contrast arises in the context of making an offer, where kelh is felicitous, but not cuz'. This paper addresses the question of how to differentiate the two meanings of the different future morphemes. The two St’átl’ímcets future morphemes pattern with the English will and be going to. I adopt Copley’s (2002) analysis of the behaviour of the two English futures in the offer context. Copley accounts for the difference between English will and be going to by appealing to their aspeectual properties. She claims be going to involves a progressive-like aspectual operator taking scope over the future modal. On the other hand, will is analysed as a bare (aspectless) future. Based on data collected in primary fieldwork, I provide an account of future expressions in St’átl’ímcets and, at the same time, test the cross-linguistic applicability of Copley’s hypothesis.

1 Introduction

This paper discusses the semantic difference between two future expressions, kelh and cuz’, in St’átl’ímcets, a Salish language spoken in the British Columbia Interior. In most contexts, the future may be expressed by using either kelh or cuz’. However, a subtle difference is apparent in native speaker responses to the use of one morpheme as opposed to the other. Specifically, at least one native speaker prefers to use cuz’ when “you know for sure” the proposition is going to happen. Thus, cuz’ is associated with certainty in a way that kelh is not. I predict, therefore, that contexts that are uncertain will permit kelh and prohibit cuz’, while contexts that require certainty will permit cuz’ and prohibit kelh. This prediction is supported in the data. A second difference between the two ways of expressing the future is that kelh may be used to make an offer, while cuz’ cannot. Thirdly, cuz’ may occur with the auxiliary plan (“already”), while kelh cannot. Thus, there is a

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* I wish to thank my language consultant, Laura Thevarge, for her knowledge and patience. Also, I thank Lisa Matthewson and my colleagues in the UBC Field Methods course 2006 for their feedback. All errors are my own.
semantic distinction between *kelh* and *cuz’* that has not previously been considered in the literature.

Like St’át’imcets, English has two ways of expressing the future: *will* and *be going to*. Copley (2002) has argued that these two expressions are future modals distinguishable on the basis of their aspectual base. Under Copley’s analysis, *be going to* has a progressive-like aspectual operator which takes scope over the future modal. *Will* is ambiguous between an aspectless reading and a generic reading, whereby a generic-like operator takes scope over the future modal.

The purpose of this paper is to consider whether the two St’át’imcets futures can be similarly distinguished on the basis of aspect. I ultimately conclude they do indeed differ aspectually, as predicted by Copley’s analysis of English.

The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides some background to the St’át’imcets data; Section 3 introduces the offer puzzle; Section 4 outlines Copley’s analysis of English *will* and *be going to*; Section 5 discusses how Copley’s analysis extends to St’át’imcets; Section 6 discusses some further predictions raised by Copley’s analysis; and Section 7 concludes.

2 Background

St’át’imcets has two ways of expressing the future: *kelh* and *cuz’*.¹ *Cuz’* is an auxiliary verb that attracts person marking clitics.

(1) **Cúz'-lhkan pun²**  

*Fut-1sg.subj find*  

"I am going to find it"

*Kelh* is a second position clitic which always occurs after the first element of the clause. Both *kelh* and *cuz’* are used to express the future.

(2) a. **Nás-kan kelh kukw**  

*go.to-1sg.subj fut cook*  

"I will go cook"  

(LT: 2007-02-01)

b. **Cúz’-lhkan nas kukw**  

*fut-1sg.subj go.to cook*

¹ The motion verb *nas*, which can be used as an aspectual auxiliary, can also result in a future interpretation, but will not be discussed in this paper.

² Data are presented in the practical orthography of the language developed by Van Eijk. The following abbreviations will be used throughout: *1* = first person; *2* = second person; *3* = third person; *deic* = deictic; *deon* = deontic; *det* = determiner; *evid* = evidential; *fut* = future; *imp* = imperfective; *intr* = autonomous intransitiver; *mid* = middle intransitivizer; *nom* = nominalizer; *poss* = possession; *red* = rediective applicative; *sg* = singular; *subj* = subject; *subjn* = subjunctive; *tr* = transitivizer.
"I am going to go cook"
(LT: 2007-02-01)

_Kelh_ has been analysed as being equivalent to English _WOLL_ (Matthewson, in press). _WOLL_ is the core element of meaning shared by English _will_ and _would_ and involves temporal ordering and, possibly, modality. No analysis of _cuz’_ has been proposed.

3 The offer puzzle

While both _kelh_ and _cuz’_ can be used to express the future, only _kelh_ can be used in the context of making an offer:

(3) Context: You are going to a potluck tomorrow night. You are sitting with a bunch of other people who will also be going to the potluck. You haven’t yet decided what you are going to bring to the potluck. The host says: “No one is going to cook a fish for dinner tomorrow. Would someone like to cook a fish?”

a. kúkw-lhká’ kelh ku s-ts’úqwaz’ ✓ offer
   _cook-1sg.subj fut det nom-fish_
   “I will cook a fish”

b. cúz’-lhkan kukw ku s-ts’úqwaz’ # offer
   _fut-1sg cook det nom-fish_
   “I am going to cook a fish”

(4) Context: A friend is organizing a charity drive whereby we will collect donations from people in exchange for hiking up a mountain. She asks me if I would like to participate in the climb.

a. xát’-em-lhká’ kelh ti s-qwé’m-a ✓ offer
   _climb-mid-1sg.subj fut det nom-mountain-det_
   “I will climb the mountain”

b. cúz’-lhkan xát’-em ti s-qwé’m-a # offer
   _fut-1sg.subj climb-mid det nom-mountain-det_
   “I am going to climb the mountain”

Speaker’s Comment: “I’m not offering, but telling her I’ll climb the mountain.”

The distinction between future markers in St’át’ímcets is consistent with the distinction previously noted in Copley (2002) between English _will_ and _be_
going to. Specifically, she noted that (5a) is an appropriate billboard advertisement, while (5b) is not.

(5)  a. We will change your oil in Madera. ✓ offer
b. We are going to change your oil in Madera. # offer

(Copley 2002: (158))

Copley argues that the billboard advertisement is an offer with a covert antecedent. That is, it contains an unpronounced “If you want...” antecedent:

(6)  a. (If you want us to change your oil in Madera,) we will change your oil in Madera. ✓ offer
b. (If you want us to change your oil in Madera,) we are going to change your oil in Madera. # offer

(Copley 2002: (163))

Copley argues that will can be used to make an offer and be going to cannot because of the difference in their aspect.

4 Copley’s analysis of English

Copley argues that will and be going to both involve a future modal, but differ in terms of their aspect. In be going to, a progressive-like operator takes scope over the future modal (the “progressive-like future”). On the other hand, will is ambiguous between two readings: an aspectless reading in which no aspectual operator takes scope over the future modal (the “bare future”), and a generic reading in which a generic-like operator takes scope over the future modal. For the purposes of this paper, I focus on the progressive-like future and the bare future, whose syntactic structures are given below, and assuming Copley’s (2002) semantics of “direction”.

(7)  a. Progressive-like future
b. Bare future

(Copley 2002: (113) and (114))
c. **Direction:** An entity d directs a proposition p in w at t iff: \( \forall w', d \) has the same abilities in w' as in w: \([\forall w''] \text{metaphysically accessible from } w' \text{ at } t \) and consistent with d's commitments in w' at t: \( \forall w''' \text{metaphysically accessible from } w \text{ at } t \) \( \exists t' > t: [p(w'')(t')] \Leftrightarrow \exists t'': > t: [p(w'''')(t'')]]]] \)

(Copley 2002: (159))

Future expressions vary in their semantic composition in terms of what worlds they quantify over.

### 4.1 The pragmatics of offering

Copley argues that the aspectual component of *will* is compatible with the pragmatics of offering, while the aspectual component of *be going to* is not. Recall that, for Copley, an offer contains an elided "If you want..." antecedent. To count as an offer, the speaker must be in a position to direct whether or not the eventuality of the consequent, the q-eventuality, will hold, assuming the semantics for direction given in (7c) above. That is, the speaker must be in a position to assert both "If you want q, will q" and "If you don't want q, not q".

The bare future, *will*, quantifies over worlds compatible with what the hearer wants at the utterance time (t). That is, it quantifies over world, time pairs at a point, as shown in the following schematic:

(8) **Bare future**

Thus, the speaker can assess at the utterance time whether the offer is consistent with the hearer's desires.

Alternatively, the progressive-like future quantifies over world, time pairs over an *interval* surrounding the utterance time and, therefore, may include both worlds that are compatible with what the hearer wants (p worlds) and those that are not compatible with what the hearer wants (not p worlds).
Because the progressive-like future quantifies over an interval, it is incompatible with offering. The future modal requires that all worlds branching off be compatible with what the hearer wants. However, the progressive-like operator forces the sentence to be evaluated over an interval, \( t' \), rather than at a point in time. At the utterance time, the hearer may want not \( q \). However, the hearer may change their mind so that, some time after \( t \) but within \( t' \), they do want \( q \). The ability of the interval \( t' \) to contain both worlds in which the hearer wants \( q \) and worlds in which the hearer does not want \( q \) renders \textit{be going to} incompatible with offering.

### 4.2 Present temporal input

Copley finds further support for the aspectual distinction between \textit{will} and \textit{be going to} in present temporal input contexts. In order to be felicitous in a present temporal input context, a predicate must possess the Subinterval Property (SIP). Copley adopts Dowty's (1979) definition of the SIP:

\[(10) \quad \text{Subinterval Property}\]

A predicate \( p \) of times has the subinterval property if and only if for all times \( t \), and for all subintervals \( t' \) of \( t \), the truth of \( p(t) \) entails the truth of \( p(t') \).

(Copley 2002: p. 18)

Copley argues that the progressive-like future has the subinterval property (i.e., is +SIP) by virtue of having a high +SIP predicate, SOME. Conversely, because the bare future does not have a +SIP predicate, it is predicted to be −SIP.

Copley further argues that only +SIP predicates are felicitous in a present temporal input context. She proposes a constraint to rule out the −SIP predication of \textit{now} as follows:
Present –SIP Constraint
For all worlds w, for –SIP predicates of times P, P(now) is undefined.
(Copley 2002: (5))

Therefore, if the bare future is –SIP, then it should be infelicitous in present temporal input contexts by virtue of the Present –SIP Constraint. Conversely, if be going to is +SIP, then it should be felicitous in the same context. Copley shows that this prediction is borne out in two present temporal input contexts: the “Oh look!” context, and the “I can’t believe …” context.

The “oh look” context requires a +SIP predicate because it forces the speaker and hearer to evaluate the situation based on evidence available in the present moment.

(12) a. Oh look! He’s going to jump!
   b. # Oh look! He will jump!
(Copley 2002: (141))

As predicted, be going to is felicitous in “oh look!” contexts while will is not.

Similarly, the “I can’t believe…” context requires a +SIP predicate because, under its idiomatic reading, the truth of the proposition is presupposed. The idiomatic reading does not doubt the truth of the proposition, it merely expresses surprise. The presupposition must be evaluated in the present moment, and therefore, -SIP predicates should be infelicitous in these contexts.

(13) a. I can’t believe you are going to get married next week!
   b. I can’t believe you will get married next week! #idiomatic
(Copley 2002: (149))

As predicted, be going to is felicitous in “I can’t believe…” contexts while will is not.

The present temporal input data show that will is –SIP and be going to is +SIP. The data support Copley’s claim that will and be going to differ in terms of their aspect. In present temporal input contexts, the progressive-like future be going to is felicitous and the bare future will is not. In offer contexts, the progressive-like future be going to is ruled out because it quantifies over an interval rather than a period, and is thus incompatible with the pragmatics of making an offer. The bare future will, on the other hand, is felicitous in offer contexts, because it quantifies over a point.

5 Application of Copley’s analysis to St’át’imcets

As shown in section 3 above, St’át’imcets kelh is felicitous in offer contexts while cuz’ is not. Kelh behaves like the bare future, which quantifies over a point. Cuz’ behaves like the progressive-like future, which quantifies
over an interval. However, independent support for this claim cannot be motivated on the basis of present temporal input contexts.

St'át'imcets is a superficially tenseless language. (Matthewson, 2003, in press). Matthewson (in press) claims that St'át'imcets has a null tense morpheme which can be interpreted in either the present tense or the past tense, depending on the context. Unlike English, St'át'imcets activity predicates can be interpreted in the present tense, without needing to be in the imperfective.

(14) sóy'seζ' kw-s Helen
    play det-nom Helen
    "Helen played / is playing " (imperfective required in English present)
    (Matthewson, 2003: (26))

For English activity predicates, the present tense requires the imperfective, as shown in the gloss of (14). Matthewson adopts Bennett and Partee's (1978) account for the English data whereby the utterance time is an instantaneous event and only +SIP predicates can hold at the utterance time without needing to be in the imperfective.

Matthewson argues that the distinction between English and St'át'imcets results from St'át'imcets's lack of an overt present tense morpheme that is distinct from the past. Without a present tense morpheme, there is nothing which would require an instantaneous moment. The St'át'imcets activity predicates, which do not possess the subinterval property, can "fit into a larger present-time interval, and therefore do not need to be in the imperfective:" (Matthewson, 2003: p. 7) Thus, the presence or absence of the subinterval property should have no bearing on what predicate can be used in present temporal inputs.

Matthewson's analysis predicts that both kelh and cuz' should be felicitous in present temporal input contexts. This prediction is borne out in the data. For example, the data in (15) involves a present temporal input context, and both future expressions are felicitous.

(15) Context: We are out for a walk along a mountain path. You look up and see a big rock, teetering on the edge. It's going to fall in front of us. I don't see the rock and you want to warn me it's about to fall.

     a. t'al-lec, cuz' k'a zil⁵ ka ti xzúm-a k'ēt'a
        stop-intr fut evid roll deon det big-det rock
        "Stop, that big rock is going to roll (down)!"

---

³ Both use the null tense morpheme, Ø.
⁴ I note that this is a controversial claim.
⁵ In Van Eijk's dictionary, the word for "roll" is xelq.
Thus, the present temporal input tests used by Copley to independently motivate a distinction between *will* and *be going to* are not available in Stát’ímcets. Instead, a language internal test must be uncovered.

One potential language internal test that has been suggested is the ability to co-occur with the aspectual auxiliary *lan* ("already"). Davis (in prep.) suggests that *lan* has the effect of foregrounding the last stage of an event:

(16) \[ \begin{array}{c|c|c} \text{Initial state} & \text{lan} & \text{final state} \\ \hline \text{...} & \text{...} & \text{...} \end{array} \]

(adapted from Davis, in prep: ch18 (40))

The effect of *lan* can be seen in the following data.

(17) a. Káohaomlhkan ...
    "I went to meet the train...."

b. (i) ... t’iq aylh ta nsem7áma.
    "... Then my wife arrived."

(ii) ... Plan aylh t’iq ta nsem7áma.\(^7\)
    "... My wife had already arrived."

(Davis, in prep: ch18 (39))

In the reading in 17(b)(i), the speaker arrived to meet the train before the wife arrived. In 17(b)(ii), however, the wife arrived before the speaker met the train. Here, *lan* has the effect of forcing the wife’s arrival to precede the speaker’s arrival. Thus, *lan* has the effect of zooming “in on the final stage of the event, putting all the rest of the event into the background”: Davis (in prep. Ch.18 p. 11).

A distinction exists between *kelh* and *cuz’* in terms of their ability to co-occur with *lan*. Specifically, *cuz’* can occur with *lan* and retain its future meaning, while *kelh* cannot.

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\(^6\) by Henry Davis in personal communication.

\(^7\) *lan* is pronounced *plan* in Upper Stát’ímcets.
You are at a party with Joel when people start singing. You ask Joel to sing a song. He agrees. Before he starts to sing, I come up to you and suggest that you ask Joel to sing a song. You want to tell me that he’s already going to sing (he just hasn’t started yet).

a. lan wa7 cuz’ it’-em
   already imp fut sing-mid.
   “He’s already going to sing.”

b. lan kelh wa7 it’-em
   already fut imp sing-mid
   * “He’s already going to sing”
   “He may be singing already”

As shown above, cuz’ retains its future reading when paired with lan, while kelh does not appear to retain its future meaning in the same context. Further evidence of this distinction is shown in the data in (19):

(19) Context: Your friend calls and invites you to bingo tonight. You agree to go. Before you leave, your niece phones and invites you to bingo as well. You want to tell her that you are already going to bingo.

a. lán-lhkan t’u7 cuz’ nas ku bingo
   already-1sg.subj just fut go det bingo
   “I am already going to go to bingo”

b. * lán-lhkan kelh t’u7 nas ku bingo
   already-1sg.subj fut just go det bingo

c. * lán-lhkan t’u7 kelh nas ku bingo
   already-1sg.subj just fut go det bingo

The same distinction exists in English. The bare future will cannot co-occur with already, but the progressive-like future be going to can.

(20) a. I am already going to go to bingo.
   b. # I will already go to bingo.

The bare future may only occur with already if it is marked for the imperfective.

(21) I will already be going to bingo.
However, (21) does not mean that the act of going to bingo has been planned by the utterance time. It means that, at some time in the future, the act of going to bingo will be in progress.

In terms of the ability to co-occur with lan/already, the distinction between the bare future and the progressive-like future in both languages may result from a requirement that lan/already require quantification over worlds.

English already has been analyzed as requiring an interval. Michaelis (1996, p. 485) argues that already not only encodes the existence of a given state of affairs (the "already-state") at the reference time, but it presupposes that the inception of this state is anterior to an interval of a specific type (the "Reference Interval"). The Reference Interval contains a state of the same type as the already-state. The already-state must be linked to the reference time, but the Reference Interval itself need not. Crucially, it must be subsequent to the already-state. She summarizes this relationship in the following schema:

(22)

\[
\text{Already state} \quad \text{Reference time} \quad q \quad q \quad q \quad q \quad q \quad q \\
\text{Reference interval} 
\]

(23) I am already going to go to bingo.

The sentence in (23) will be true if, at the reference time (here, the Utterance Time), the speaker has already made the decision to go to bingo. The reference interval, the interval in which the decision to go to bingo holds, must temporally follow the original decision. Importantly, already requires an assessment over an interval, the reference interval, in order to determine whether the already-state holds during that interval. Thus, it is compatible with the progressive-like future, which also quantifies over world, time pairs over an interval, but is incompatible with the bare future, which quantifies over world, time pairs at a point.

The lan data provide independent support for Copley's analysis that the bare future and the progressive-like future differ aspectually. Lan necessarily
involves an interval, and thus is compatible with the *cuz’* because it quantifies over an interval: the progressive-like future. *Kelh* is not compatible with *lan* because it quantifies over a point. Conversely, *kelh* is compatible with the pragmatics of making an offer precisely because it quantifies over a point, whereas *cuz’* is not compatible with offering because it quantifies over an interval.

6 Further questions

Copley argues that *will* and *be going to* differ aspectually. *Will* has no aspectual operator taking scope over the future modal, while *be going to* involves a progressive-like operator taking scope over the future modal. This analysis raises a number of questions and makes some very significant predictions, which require further research.

6.1 Compositionality

This analysis predicts that, in some languages, the combination of future marker and progressive operator might be morphologically visible. Reis Silva (2006) has argued that Blackfoot, an Algonquian language spoken in Southern Alberta, may be one such language. Blackfoot also has two future expressions, *áak* and *áyaak*. *Áak* behaves like *kelh* and *will* in that it is felicitous in offer contexts. Conversely, *áyaak* behaves like *cuz’* and *be going to* in that it cannot be used to make an offer.

(24) Context: A party is already planned and the host is looking for a volunteer to cook.

a. Kammistenikii nistoo nitáaksojoosi
   kamm-isteniki nistoo nit-áak-ojoosi
   if-want 1sg 1sg-fut-cook
   “If you wish, I will cook.” #offer

b. Kammistenikii nistoo nitáyaaksojoosi
   kamm-isteniki nistoo nit-áyaak-ojoosi
   if-want 1sg 1sg-fut-cook
   “If you wish, I am going to cook.”

Reis Silva argues, following Frantz (1991), that *áyaak* is morphologically composed of the future expression *áak* plus the durative marker *a*-⁸. This is further evidence in favour of Copley’s analysis of the distinction between aspectual components of future markers: specifically, it is evidence in favour

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⁸ The durative is not a progressive marker, but is likely an imperfective marker. See Dunham (2007) for further discussion.
of the fact that the progressive-like future is composed of a future modal and a
progressive-like operator.

In St'át'imcets, *cuz'* is morpho-syntactically in the same class as other
aspectual operators, e.g. *wa7* and *plan*. On the other hand, *kelh* is in the same
class as other modals, among other things, but that are not aspectual. This
may suggest that *cuz'* has an aspectual component that *kelh* lacks.

### 6.2 Progressive vs. imperfective operators

In Copley's original analysis, *be going to* comprises a progressive
operator (as opposed to a progressive-like operator) taking scope over the
future modal. It is unclear how that analysis would treat a language with no
morphologically realized progressive operator. St'át'imcets has an
imperfective operator, realized as the aspectual auxiliary *wa7*, but does not
appear to have a progressive. It is unclear whether Copley's analysis forces
every language to have a (covert) progressive operator, or whether the
progressive-like operator is really an imperfective operator in languages with
no overt progressive. In any event, Copley has subsequently relabeled her
operator the "progressive-like" operator (see Copley, to appear), presumably in
order to avoid this type of issue.

### 6.3 Co-occurrence of future expressions

The St'át'imcets futures pattern in a way that is distinct from the
English futures. That is, *kelh* and *cuz'* can co-occur and seemingly both retain
their future meanings. *Will* and *be going to* cannot.

(25)  

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>I will jump.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td><em>be going to</em> jump.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>I will be going to jump.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In (25a) and (25b), *will* and *be going to* have a future reading. However,
where both occur, as in (25c), *will* continues to contribute a future meaning,
however, *be going to* is limited to marking movement or direction, as
exemplified in (26):

(26)  

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td><em>be going to</em> [over there] to jump.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td><em>be going to</em> [to John's house] to jump [on his trampoline].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>?? I will be going to jump [tomorrow].</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Importantly, *be going to* does not seem to retain its future meaning when
combined with *will* in a sentence.

Moreover, a sentence with both *will* and *be going to* cannot be used to
make an offer:
Context: You are at your grandson’s birthday. He hurt his hand, and can’t cut the cake after blowing out the candles. You watch him try to manoeuver the knife, but see that he is having trouble. You want to offer to cut the cake for him.

a. I will cut the cake. ✓ offer
b. I am going to cut the cake. # offer
c. ? I will be going to cut the cake. # offer

Thus, in English, it appears that when both future markers co-occur, be going to loses its future meaning and will loses its ability to be felicitous in offer contexts.

Conversely, St’at’imcets cuz’ and kelh appear to be able to co-occur and the resulting sentence is still a valid offer:

Context: You are at your grandson’s birthday. He hurt his hand, and can’t cut the cake after blowing out the candles. You watch him try to manoeuver the knife, but see that he is having trouble. You want to offer to cut the cake for him.

a. cuz’-lhkan nfk’-in’ ti kîks-tsw-a
cut-tr 1sgsubj det cake-2poss-det
“I will cut the cake”

Speaker’s comment: it’s grammatical, but you’re not volunteering to cut the cake. You’re telling him.

b. nik’-ín’-lhkan kelh ti kîks-tsw-a
cut-tr 1sgsubj fut det cake-2poss-det
“I will cut the cake” ✓ offer

Speaker’s comment: you are volunteering to cut the cake

c. cuz’-lhkan kelh nfk’-in’ ti k’iks-tsw-a
cut-tr 1sgsubj fut cut-tr det cake-2poss-det
“I will cut the cake” ✓ offer

Context: You are sitting with some friends in your apartment. You all want to go to bingo, but your niece, who was supposed to drive, is running late. You want to offer to drive everyone to bingo.

a. cuz’-lhkan tqálk’-em lh-xat’-min’-ál’ap
drive-intr 1sgsubj if-want-red-2pl.sbjn
Thus, when Stát’ímcets futures co-occur, it appears that kelh retains its ability to be felicitous in an offer context. It is unclear what status caz’ has when it co-occurs with kelh.

At this point, I have no answer to this question. One possibility may be that the difference between English and Stát’ímcets arises because of the syntactic types of the future expressions. In English, both will and be going to are auxiliaries that precede the main verb. Perhaps there is some constraint on the co-occurrence of like syntactic elements that prohibits the co-occurrence of will and be going to. Such a constraint would not apply in Stát’ímcets, because caz’ is an auxiliary but kelh is a second position clitic.

Another alternative may be that the difference arises because caz’ and be going to make use of a different aspectual operator. As noted above, be going to is analyzed as a progressive operator taking scope over the future modal. Because Stát’ímcets has no progressive operator, it is presumed that some other operator, potentially the imperfective, is taking scope over the future modal in caz’. Perhaps the difference resulting from co-occurrence in English versus Stát’ímcets can be attributed to the difference between a progressive operator as opposed to an imperfective operator. However, it is not at all clear to me what that difference might be.

The Blackfoot data is unhelpful in attempting to determine if either of the (very preliminary) ideas are on the right track. Blackfoot prohibits the co-occurrence of áak and dáaak. If Frantz (1991) and Reis Silva (2006) are correct that dáaak is composed of áak plus the durative, then we would predict that aak could not be added to a sentence with áaak. In áaak, the preverbal position for tense will already be filled and there would be no place for the uncombined aak to surface. While this may lend support for the idea that the co-occurrence restrictions are syntactic, the co-occurrence in Blackfoot may be entirely syntactic and have nothing to say about aspect whatsoever. As such, further research is required before we can know how all of these remaining pieces fit together.

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9 The constraint would only affect aspectual be going to. Directional be going to is still permitted, as shown in (26c).
10 Reis Silva, personal communication.
Conclusion

The St’át’l’imcets futures, *kelh* and *cuz’*, pattern as predicted by Copley’s analysis. *Kelh* patterns with Copley’s bare future, and is felicitous in offer contexts. *Cuz’* patterns with Copley’s progressive-like future, and is incompatible with the pragmatics of offering. The data involving *lan* offer independent evidence favouring the aspectual distinction between *kelh* and *cuz’*. Though not discussed in Copley (2002), the inability of the bare future to co-occur with *already* holds in English as well as in St’át’l’imcets. Thus, St’át’l’imcets provides further evidence in favour of Copley’s analysis of the semantics of the future.

References


Davis, Henry. In prep. *A teaching grammar of St’át’l’imcets*.


