On Proper Names in St’át’ímcets

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Abstract: This paper investigates the syntax and semantics of proper names in St’át’ímcets (Lillooet Salish). It argues for a dual representation of proper nouns. On the one hand, bare (non-nominalized) proper nouns resemble common nouns in being lexically predicative: they take the full range of common noun determiners and may be pluralized, modified, and act as the restrictions of quantifiers. On the other hand, when prefixed with the “nominalizer” s-, which occurs on proper nouns in both predicate and argument positions, proper nouns behave semantically as directly referring expressions: they take a special proprial determiner and cannot be pluralized, modified, nor act as the restriction of a quantifier. It is argued that proper nouns are lexically represented both as predicates of type \(\langle e,t\rangle\), in which case they function like common nouns, or as arguments of type \(e\), in which case they must be shifted into a predicative type in order to enter the composition, while maintaining their “referential” character: this is the function of “nominalizing” s-.

Keywords: St’át’ímcets, Salish, proper names, determiners, nominalization

1 Introduction

One of the most notorious dangers of working on languages as superficially “exotic” as those of the Salish family is to get intoxicated by their strangeness, and as a consequence misinterpret properties that turn out on closer inspection to be not so exotic after all. But there is a complementary affliction that mostly affects those who have been working on Salish for a long time: that is, to ignore phenomena that are genuinely strange, precisely because they have become so familiar that we fail to recognize how exotic they actually are.

This paper is about one of these phenomena: the grammar of proper nouns in St’át’ímcets (a.k.a. Lillooet, ISO-363 lil; Northern Interior Salish), which turns out to be not only different from that of more familiar European languages, but also, to the best of my knowledge, from that of any other Salish language. Of particular interest in this respect is the presence of the nominalizing prefix s- on proper nouns in both predicate and argument positions, though never on proper names when used in isolation; as far as I can see, no other Salish language ever nominalizes proper nouns.

In accounting for this and other properties of proper nouns in St’át’ímcets, I will make the following key empirical claims:

As ever, my deepest debt is to the St’át’ímcets speakers, past and present, whose insights and wisdom pervade this work. For this paper, I am particularly grateful to Carl Alexander (Qway7án’ak) for his years of dedication to the documentation of his first language. I would also like to thank the members of the Salish Working Group, Lisa Matthewson, Ora Matushansky, Malte Zimmermann, the organizers and audience of the 2018 GLOW Syntax Workshop on Predication, and the audience at the 53rd ICSNL at the Whatcom County Museum in Bellingham, WA. This work has been supported by SSHRC Insight grant #435-2015-1694 to the author. Author’s e-mail: henry.davis@ubc.ca.

When not nominalized, proper nouns in St’át’ímctets act just like common nouns. They take the full range of common noun determiners, and may be pluralized, modified, or act as the restriction of a quantifier.

However, when nominalized, proper nouns act like directly referential expressions: in argument positions, they occur with a special proprial determiner rather than common noun determiners; they may only be pluralized via an associative marker, and they may neither be modified nor act as the restriction of a quantifier.

I consider two accounts for (i) and (ii). The first attributes the referential status of nominalized proper nouns to the lexical entry of the nominalizer itself, which restricts the denotation of proper noun predicates to unique individuals. I reject this account on the basis that it fails to generalize to nominalization on common nouns, which is very frequent in St’át’ímctets (as in the rest of Salish), but carries no uniqueness presupposition.

Instead, I propose that proper nouns in St’át’ímctets are lexically ambiguous. In their common noun guise, they enter the derivation as ordinary nominal predicates roughly meaning ‘bearing the name X’. In their nominalized guise, however, they start off as referential expressions of type e (or its intensional equivalent), and are then converted to predicates by a semantic operation whose morphological reflex is the nominalizer s-. This allows for a general account of nominalization as predicativization, which extends to common nouns under a neo-Carlsonian account where they begin life as kinds of type e but in order to enter the derivation must be converted to nominal predicates of type ⟨e,t⟩ (or its intensional equivalent).

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I give an elementary introduction to the treatment of proper nouns in the philosophical and linguistic literature, focusing on the distinction between predicativist and direct reference theories. In Section 3, I examine the cultural context of naming in St’át’ímctets, with a view to assessing its potential relevance to the grammar of proper names in the language. Sections 4 to 5 contain the empirical core of the paper: Section 4 deals with non-nominalized and Section 5 with nominalized proper names. Section 6 provides an analysis of the two types, and Section 7 concludes.

2 A very brief introduction to the semantics and syntax of proper nouns

The grammar of proper nouns has been a central concern of linguistically inclined philosophers and linguists for centuries, and has accumulated an immense literature, which it is impossible to adequately characterize here. Instead, I will pick out some central themes which bear directly on the empirical arguments detailed in sections 4 and 5 of the current paper.

2.1 How different are proper names?

One way of looking at the controversy surrounding proper names is to ask how different they are from common nouns (or NPs). The latter are standardly represented as predicates (sets or their characteristic functions, of semantic type ⟨e,t⟩), and we will provisionally assume that representation here.¹ As such, in order to form an argument, they must combine with a

¹ Throughout this paper, I will abstract away from intensions for the purposes of exposition. This is certainly an over-simplification, and also empirically inadequate when dealing with, e.g., the stage-level nature of proper name predicates in St’át’ímctets.
determiner, which may either yield a referential expression (of type $e$) or a generalized quantifier (of type $\langle\langle e,t\rangle,t\rangle$).

One hypothesis holds that proper nouns are essentially identical to common nouns. Such a view, known as the *predicative* theory of proper names, has antecedents in the *descriptivist* tradition of Frege and Russell, and is sometimes also called *metalinguistic descriptivism* (Cumming 2016). It holds that proper names are predicates, just like common nouns: more specifically, they are predicates of *naming* (Burge 1973, Geurts 1997, Matushansky 2008, Fara 2015). So for example, the meaning of the predicate ‘John’ can be viewed as the property of bearing the name “John”, as in (1):

(1) $[[\text{John}]] = \lambda x. \text{x bears the name } /\text{jan}/$

Linguistic proponents of the predicative theory naturally point to parallels between common and proper nouns. These include the following:

(i) Proper nouns can be modified.
(ii) Proper nouns may act as the restrictions of quantifiers.
(iii) In many languages (including English) all or some proper nouns take determiners.
(iv) Proper nouns are the predicates of small clauses in naming constructions.

These properties are illustrated in (2)–(5).

(2) [The tall John and the short one] both rode into town.
(3) [Every John I know] is taller than me.
(4) [The Smiths] are here.
(5) They named [their son John].

In answer to the counter-argument that (3) and (4) involve “special” uses of proper nouns as common nouns, predicativists point to the fact (first laid out systematically in Sloat 1969) that there is only one environment where proper nouns do not show the distributional properties of common nouns. In singular definite contexts, a common noun must be preceded by ‘the’ (6a) but a proper noun cannot be (6b):

(6) a. *(The) man left.
   b. (*The) John left.

In other words, the unusual case is actually (6), where the distribution of proper nouns *differs* from that of common nouns, rather than (3) and (4), where they behave identically.

In opposition to predicativism is the hypothesis that proper nouns involve *direct reference*. Under this view (sometimes termed *Millianism* after J. S. Mill, one of its most famous proponents), proper names simply refer to their bearers, and are therefore underived referential expressions of type $e$, as in (7).

(7) $[[\text{John}]] = \text{John}$
This makes proper nouns very different from common nouns of type \( \langle e,t \rangle \). Proponents of direct reference accordingly emphasize differences between proper and common nouns, often drawing a parallel between proper nouns and the two other classes of element which have been claimed to be directly referential: indexicals (‘I’, ‘you’, etc.) and demonstratives (‘this’, ‘that’, etc.) (Kaplan 1989). In particular, they point out that these classes are rigid designators (Kripke 1980): that is, they pick out the same individual across worlds, as exemplified particularly clearly by their behavior in modal contexts, where they appear to always take obligatory wide scope.² However, though they are often lumped together, rigid designation does not entail direct reference: definite descriptions such as ‘the successor of three’ are rigid designators, even though they do not refer directly (LaPorte 2018).

Nevertheless, it is certainly the case cross-linguistically that proper nouns often group with demonstratives and personal pronouns, in opposition to common nouns. For example, the Tsimshianic languages of northern British Columbia have two sets of determiners, one for common nouns, and one for proper nouns, demonstratives, and independent pronouns (Davis 2018). More broadly, the existence of a special set of proprial (proper noun) determiners distinct from definite determiners is not predicted by any theory that treats proper nouns as ordinary predicates and DPs based on them as definite descriptions, but is in fact common cross-linguistically: to name just a few well-known examples, Catalan, Icelandic, Tagalog and Maori all have distinct proprial articles (Muñoz to appear).

It should be clear even from this brief description that there is something procrustean about the debate between the predicativist and referential camps. The very fact that proper nouns can be used predicatively argues that a purely referential account must be supplemented by some provision for cases where they do not directly refer, while the cluster of properties that led to the direct reference theory (e.g., scopelessness, rigidity) pose a challenge for any account that treats proper nouns the same way as ordinary common nouns. We clearly need an account that shares characteristics of both camps; and as we shall see, the behaviour of proper nouns in St’át’imcets provides quite striking support for this contention.

3 Proper names and naming in the St’át’imc cultural context

Because names and naming in traditional St’át’imc society differ from those in the English-speaking world, it is possible that these differences might be reflected in their respective grammars. Accordingly, in this section I give a brief introduction to naming practices amongst the St’át’imc. Though due to a century and a half of European domination it is hard to reconstruct the exact details of St’át’imc naming practices in precolonial times, it is certainly possible to give a broad outline, particularly since traditional names and naming practices persist to this day alongside those imposed by the colonial government and church.³

There appear to have been two types of names in traditional St’át’imc society. The first were informal, interchangeable, and in some ways more like epithets (pet names) than proper names. For example, Francis “Bill” Edwards, who was from Ts’k’wáylacw (Pavilion), reports that he didn’t have a regular St’át’imcets name at all before being sent to residential school.⁴

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² Though Kripke (1980) argues that rigidity cannot be reduced to “wide scopism”.
³ See Montler (2012) for remarks on traditional names in Klallam.
⁴ Examples are given in the modified version of the van Eijk orthography employed in Alexander (2016) and Edwards et al. (2017). All unattributed examples are from original fieldwork by the author. Unless
Before the time I am talking about here, before I left for school...

...I was called by all kinds of different names, just Indian names.

Then there was also Tsucwínem, Petsklhánk, Pexwpánk, oh I was called all kinds of different names, but I don't remember the others.'
Of the last three names mentioned, Petsklhánk means literally ‘Leaf Belly’, from √petskelh ‘leaf’ and the lexical suffix -ank ‘belly’, while Pexwpánk means ‘Squirting Belly’ from √pexw ‘spray, squirt’, -p ‘inchoative’, and -ank ‘belly’. Tsucwínem does not have an obvious literal meaning.

Nicknames were not just given to children: adults also bore them (and still do), and in this case they often refer to physical or personality quirks, and may become permanently associated with the bearer. Contemporary or recent examples include Qwástaxwats ‘Hairy Chest’, from √qwats ‘hair, fur, feathers’ and -axwats ‘chest’, Amhálhts’a7 ‘Good-Natured’ from √áma ‘good’ and -alhts’a7 ‘flesh, inside of body’, Ntíhten ‘Teapot’, from √tít ‘tea’ (English), and n...-ten ‘container’ (so named because the bearer had a habit of putting her hands on her hips in a shape that resembled a teapot). The “old” word for a nickname is kwaštáỵ, but these days skwatsitsísuṭ (meaning ‘any old name’, with the nominalizer ṣ, the root √kwásits ‘name’, and the ‘out-of-control’ suffix -súṭ) is often used instead.

The second class of traditional Stát’ímc names are more formal, and are handed down from generation to generation (usually but not necessarily within the same family) via a special “name-raising” ceremony, which usually takes place at gatherings. (The verb cátan ‘to raise something’ is used to describe the act of passing a name from one bearer to another.) Names may acquire prestige from particularly powerful forebearers: it is both an honour and a responsibility to bear such names, and if no one is deemed worthy to assume it, a name may pass out of use. It is possible to bear more than one ancestral name, or to have none at all. Many but not all ancestral names bear a recognizable relation to a noun with descriptive content, some transparently so, such as Nk’yap ‘coyote’, Qatsk ‘elder brother’, others partially so, such as Ntsáqwemlha7, which contains the root √tsáqwem ‘saskatoon berry’, along with the locative prefix n- and the suffix -lha7, whose meaning is obscure but which occurs on some animal names. Lexical suffixes are common in traditional names, with -asq’et ‘day’ characteristic of male names (e.g., Gitásq’et, a famous chief) and -in’ak ‘gun’ characteristic of female names (e.g., Huysín’ak), for reasons which are obscure.

The relation between nicknames and ancestral names is not fixed: nicknames can be passed down and thus become ancestral names. The ancestral name Xíts’ken ‘back’, for example, was originally the nickname of a man with a broken back. A particularly interesting example comes from Carl Alexander, whose inherited the name Qwa7yán’ak ‘blue belly’ from his father via his older brother. Carl tells the story of how the name originated in Alexander (2016:179–194). It began as a nickname given to his father when he accidentally used qwa7yán’ak to refer to a stomach ache caused by eating too many berries, instead of the correct form qwa7ez’ilhmeṇc. Both words come from √qwásq−qway ‘blue’, the inchoative infix -7-, and lexical suffixes for stomach (-an’ak and -alhmeṇc), and both mean literally ‘belly becomes blue’; however, only qwa7ez’ilhmeṇc has the idiomatic meaning of an upset stomach, so Carl’s father was saying that he literally had a blue belly. The nickname stuck, and was then passed down the family as an ancestral name.

Of course, in addition to nicknames and ancestral names, since colonial times the Stát’ímc have also had white people’s names, termed (n)sem7ásk’a7 in Stát’ímcets, from √sáma7 ‘white person’ and the lexical suffix (n...-ask’a7 ‘song, name’. Particularly in early colonial times, these names were often phonologically adapted into Stát’ímcets: for example, ‘Patrick’ became Páotlek, ‘Pierre’ became Pyal, and Josephine became Sáopín. The hypocoristic English kin terms ‘mama’, ‘ma’, and ‘pa’ were also adapted into Stát’ímcets as the nicknames Mama, Mah, and Pah, alongside the original Stát’ímcets Táta ‘auntie’. These adapted names could then be elaborated further with the addition of lexical suffixes, as in Máhyeqs and Pexwpáṇs, which contain the suffix -yeqs ‘nose’. An interesting property of both borrowed and indigenous proper names is the extensive use of vowel retraction as a hypocoristic device: the proper name Ṣógpəo7, for
example, is a retracted version of súspa7 ‘tail’, and English Joseph was adapted into St’át’ímcets both as Tsusp and its retracted counterpart Ts7ásp. Obviously, there is more to be said about the roles of names and naming in St’át’ímc society. This brief introduction is simply by way of establishing two points. First, names were clearly more transferable in traditional St’át’ímc society than in Western culture: rather than being unique “lifetime properties” they were treated as possessions which could be given or received, often multiple times during a lifetime. Second, there was a high degree of integration between traditional St’át’ímc names and adopted western names, at least during the period up until the second world war when St’át’ímcets and English coexisted on more or less equal terms.

With this background in place, we now move to a closer examination of the grammatical distribution of proper names in St’át’ímcets, beginning in Section 4 with non-nominalized names and then turning in Section 5 to nominalized ones.

4 Bare (non-nominalized) proper names

Bare (non-nominalized) proper nouns in St’át’ímcets act semantically as set-denoting predicates, and syntactically as ordinary common nouns. They may occur either in argument positions or in predicate position.

In argument positions, bare proper nouns occur with the full range of common noun determiners to yield DPs which behave syntactically exactly like DPs based on common nouns. They may be pluralized (9), modified (10), quantified, (11), clefted (12), and possessed (13), and may occur in low scope indefinite positions, including under negation (14), in there-insertion contexts (15), in the scope of conditionals (16), and in sluicing environments (17). Note that in all these contexts the nominalizer s- is not only systematically absent but ungrammatical on the proper noun, as shown explicitly in (11).

(9) n7án’ was ken-ts7á i=John=a.
    two.human around-here PL.DET=John=EXIS
    ‘There are two Johns around here.’

(10) wá7=lhkacw=ha zewát-en [na=zác-al’qwem’=a John]?
    IPFV=2SG.SUBJ=Q know-DIR [ABSN.DET=long-looking=EXIS John]
    ‘Do you know the tall John?’

(11) wa7 láti7 gaw’-p=wít tákem nelh=(s-)Johns=a
    IPFV there.VIS gather-INCH=3PL all PL.ABSN.DET=(*NMLZ-)Johns=EXIS inátcwas.
yesterday
    ‘All the Johns gathered there yesterday.’
    Consultant’s comment: ‘That s- doesn’t belong there — sounds funny if it’s there.’

(12) nílh [ta=lheq’íq’-al’qwem’=a John] wa7 zewát-en-an.
    COP [DET=short-looking=EXIS John] IPFV know-DIR-1SG.ERG
    ‘It’s the short John I know.’

5 ‘John’ is a common last name as well as a first name amongst the St’át’ímc.
(13) sawlhen-mín-as láta7 \( \text{ta=Johnny-s=a.} \)  
ask-RLT-3ERG there DET=Johnny-3POSS=EXIS  
‘She asked about her Johnny.’  
(Edwards et al. 2017:281)

(14) cw7áoy=t’u7 káti7 ku=Johnny.  
NEG=EXCL around.there DET=Johnny  
‘There was no Johnny around there.’  
(Edwards et al. 2017:282)

(15) wá7=k’a \( \text{ta=John=a} \) lt7u n-lep’-cál-ten-sw=a.  
be=EPIS DET=John=EXIS at=over.there.VIS LOC-bury-ACT-INS-2SG.POSS=EXIS  
‘There’s apparently a John over there in your garden.’

(16) lh=7áts’x-en-acw ku=John. síma7 sqwál’-en-ts!  
COMP=see-DIR-2SG.ERG DET=John come.IMP inform-DET-1SG.OBJ  
‘If you see a John, come and tell me.’

(17) áts’x-en=lhkan séná7 \( \text{ta=John=a, t’u7 cw7áoy=t’u7 kwenswá} \)  
see-DIR-1SG.SU CNTR DET=John=EXIS but NEG=EXCL DET+1SG.POSS +NMLZ+IPFV  
lex•láx-s lh=swát=as.  
TRED*remember-CAUS COMP=who=3SJV  
‘I saw a John, but I don’t remember which.’

In (18)–(20), we see the predicative use of bare proper nouns: they occur in canonical (initial) position unless preceded by auxiliaries, as in (20), and do not (and cannot) take a determiner.

(18) \( \text{John=ha=t’u7 ta=kúkwpi7=a láku7 tsal’áhl=a?} \)  
\( \text{John=Q=EXCL DET=John=EXIS INV.there Shalalth=EXIS} \)  
‘Is the chief over in Shalalth still a John?’

(19) aoz káti7! Peters ti7 \( \text{ta=wá7 kúkwpi7 láku7 lhkúnsa.} \)  
NEG VIS.around.there Peters DEM DET=IPFV chief INV.there now  
‘Certainly not! The chief there is a Peters at the moment.’

(20) o! tsut-ánwas=kan kwas papt wa7 \( \text{John} \)  
oh say-inside=1SG.SU DET=NMLZ+IPFV+3POSS always IPFV  
iz’ i=wa7 kúkwpi7 l=kw7ú-na.  
PL.DEM PL.DET=IPFV chief at=INVS.there-precisely  
‘Oh! I thought the chiefs over there were always Johns.’

Just as with argument positions, bare proper nouns in predicate position cannot be nominalized. If we attempt to nominalize the proper name predicate in (18), for example, we get a different interpretation, shown in (21), where ‘John’ refers to a unique individual rather than one of the set of Johns:

\( \text{John=ha=t’u7 ta=kúkwpi7=a láku7 tsal’áhl=a?} \)  
\( \text{John=Q=EXCL DET=John=EXIS INV.there Shalalth=EXIS} \)  
‘Is the chief over in Shalalth still a John?’

(21) aoz káti7! Peters ti7 \( \text{ta=wá7 kúkwpi7 láku7 lhkúnsa.} \)  
NEG VIS.around.there Peters DEM DET=IPFV chief INV.there now  
‘Certainly not! The chief there is a Peters at the moment.’

However, it is important to be aware that because the nominalizer s- is frequently dropped from nominalized proper nouns in predicate position (see 5.2 below), an individual-referring interpretation identical to that in (21) holds for (18) in addition to the non-nominalized (set-referring) interpretation.
(21) \textit{s-John}=ha=t’u7 \textit{ta=kúkwpi7=a láku7 tsal’áih=a?} \\
\textit{NMLZ-John}=Q=EXCL \textit{DET=John=EXIS} \textit{INV.there Shalalth=EXIS} \\
‘Is the chief over in Shalalth still John?’

Another contrast between bare and nominalized proper names emerges with plurality. In contrast to bare names, which can be freely pluralized (see (9) above), if we attempt to give a plural interpretation to a nominalized predicative proper name, the result is infelicitous, as shown in the contrast between (20) above and (22) below:

(22) #O! tsut-ánwas=kan kwas papt wa7 \textit{s-John}  \\
oh say-inside=1SG.SU \textit{DET+NMLZ+IPFV+3POSS} \textit{always IPFV NMLZ-John}  \\
iz’ i=wá7 kúkwpi7 l=kw7ú-na.  \\
\textit{PL.DEM PL.DET=IPFV chief at=INV.there-precisely}  \\
# ‘Oh! I thought the chiefs over there were always John.’  \\
\textit{Consultant’s comment:} ‘That \textit{s-} in front of the \textit{John} isn’t right, ‘cause that \textit{sJohn} is a first name and a single person, and that \textit{iz’} is more than one.’

Finally, only bare proper nouns may be used as vocatives; nominalized proper names are categorically rejected in this context, as first observed by van Eijk (1997:179).

(23) \textit{Cultus Jack}, síma7 táhl-lec, sqwal ku=s-záyten-su.  \\
\textit{Cultus Jack} come.here stand-AUT report PN.DET=NMLZ-business-2SG.POSS  \\
‘Cultus Jack, come stand up here and report on your business.’ (Edwards et al. 2017:154)

(24) síma7 e=ts7á, (*s-)\textit{John}!  \\
come to=here (*NMLZ-)\textit{John}  \\
‘Come here, John!’

To summarize: in their non-nominalized (bare) guise, proper names simply behave like any other common noun. This is very different from their behaviour when nominalized, as we will see further in the next section.

5 Nominalized proper names

Proper names nominalized with \textit{s-} occur much more frequently in St’át’imcets than bare proper names. Like bare proper names, they occur in both argument and predicate positions: these are discussed in 5.1 and 5.2, respectively.

5.1 Nominalized proper names in argument positions

Unlike bare proper nouns, nominalized proper nouns in argument positions may be introduced by a special proprial (proper noun) determiner \textit{kw=}.\footnote{As far as I know, St’át’imcets is the only Salish language with a proprial determiner.} The proprial determiner occurs in all core argument positions, as shown in (25)–(27), with an intransitive subject, an object, and a transitive subject, respectively:
(25) án’was=t’u7 lhálí7 sxetspásq’et, nilh=t’u7 s=xan’=s
two=EXCL from.there week COP=EXCL NMLZ=hurt=3POSS
kw=s-August Peter ts a7 láku7 qˇw7-um.
P法定NMLZ-August Peter DET+NMLZ+IPFV+3POSS IPFV theretrap-MID
‘Just two weeks later, August Peter got injured where he was trapping.’
(Edwards et al. 2017:92)

(26) ts7as cwíl’-en-as kw=s-Laura.
come seek-DIR-3ERG PN法定NMLZ-Laura
‘He came looking for Laura.’
(Matthewson 2005:137)

(27) wa7 kens-tsáq-an’-as ta=qˇwem*émw’es=a kw=s-Cathy.
IPFV try-tame-DIR-3ERG DET=wild*CRED=EXIS PN法定NMLZ-Cathy
‘Cathy is trying to tame a wild colt.’

However, outside of these canonical argument positions, the proprial determiner is generally judged ungrammatical, as can be seen in the examples in (28)–(30), which feature proper nouns as the focus of a cleft, as a possessor, and as the object of a preposition, respectively.

(28) nilh (*kw=s)-Skalúla7 tsa=omiqw-s n-spápez7=a.
COP (*PN法定DET=)NMLZ-Skalúla7 great.grandparent-3POSS 1SG.POSS-grandfather=EXIS
‘It was Skalúla7 who was my grandfather’s great-grandfather.’

(29) cik-aka7-mín-itas [ta=káoh-s=a (*kw=s)-Bill].
push-hand-RLT-3PL.ERG [DET=car-3POSS=EXIS (*PN法定DET=)NMLZ-Bill]
‘They pushed Bill’s car.’

(30) kwám•em=lhkan ta=s-mets-alˇikst=a [lhel=(*kw=s)-Bill].
get+FRED=1SG.SUBJ DET=NMLZ-write-page=EXIS [from=(*PN法定DET=)NMLZ-Bill]
‘I got a letter from Bill.’

Furthermore, even in canonical argument positions, the proprial determiner is never obligatory, as can be seen from the examples in (31)–(33), which are directly comparable to (25)–(27) above.

(31) áozz=t’u7 kw=s=zwát-en-an i=zúqw=as=k’a s-Joe Link.
NEG=EXCL DET=NMLZ=know-DIR-1SG.ERG when.PST=die=3SJV=EPIS NMLZ-Joe Link
‘I don’t know when Joe Link must have died.’
(Alexander 2016:118)

(32) lh=7áts’x-en-acw s-Laura. tsun xwem=ás kw=s=nas=ts
COMP=DIR-2SG.ERG NMLZ-Laura say+DIR quick=3SJV DET=NMLZ=go=3POSS
úxwal’. go.home
‘If you see Laura, tell her to go home quick.’
(Matthewson 2005:139)

(33) kwán-as láti7 ta=silhts’7=a s-P’xus.
take+DIR-3ERG there.VIS DET=shoe=EXIS NMLZ-P’xus
‘Then P’xus took a shoe.’
(Alexander 2016:144)
Crucially, however, in all these environments the nominalizer is still obligatorily present, whether or not the proprial determiner is missing.\footnote{There is one apparent exception to this generalization: in the Lower (Mount Currie) dialect of St’át’imcets, the proprial determiner (usually reduced from kw= to k=) may appear on its own in argument positions:}

The behavior of nominalized proper nouns in coordinate structures is also distinctive. As a rule, only the first of a sequence of conjoined proper nouns in argument position may take the proprial determiner, and even then only marginally.

\begin{enumerate}
\item[(34)]\begin{verbatim}
wá7=wit alkst [(??kw=)s-Bill múta7 (*kw=)s-John].
   IPFV=3PL work [(?PN.DET=)NMLZ-Bill and (*PN.DET=)NMLZ-John]
   ‘Bill and John are working.’
\end{verbatim}
\end{enumerate}

 Speakers prefer to introduce coordinated proper names with the plural proclitic wi= ‘plus’, as in (35):

\begin{enumerate}
\item[(35)]\begin{verbatim}
wá7=wit alkst [wi=s-Bill múta7 s-John].
   IPFV=3PL work [PL=NMLZ-Bill and NMLZ-John]
   ‘Bill and John are working.’
\end{verbatim}
\end{enumerate}

Plural wi= may also occur with a singular (non-conjoined) nominalized proper noun, in which case the resulting meaning is that of an associative plural (36)–(37).

\begin{enumerate}
\item[(36)]\begin{verbatim}
gaw’=p=wít [wi=s-Teresa].
   gather-INCH=3PL [PL=NMLZ-Teresa]
   ‘Teresa and her family met.’
\end{verbatim}
\end{enumerate}

\begin{enumerate}
\item[(37)]\begin{verbatim}
   COP [PL=NMLZ-Laura] get.there see-DIR-1SG.ERG
   ‘It was Laura and her family I went to see.’
\end{verbatim}
\end{enumerate}

\footnotetext[8]{There is one apparent exception to this generalization: in the Lower (Mount Currie) dialect of St’át’imcets, the proprial determiner (usually reduced from kw= to k=) may appear on its own in argument positions:}

\begin{enumerate}
\item[(i)]\begin{verbatim}
qwál’-en-tumulh-as k=Máomao kwat xíl-em.
   tell-DIR-1PL.OBJ-3ERG PN.DET=Máomao DET+NMLZ+IPFV+1PL.SJV do-MID
   ‘Máomao told us what to do.’
\end{verbatim}
\end{enumerate}

However, the proprial determiner is optional in Lower St’át’imcets, as in the Upper dialect, and when it is missing, nominalization is always present, just as in the Upper dialect:

\begin{enumerate}
\item[(ii)]\begin{verbatim}
qwámqwmet-s-as s-Máomao tsáta xíl-em.
   funny-CAUS-3ERG NMLZ-Máomao DET+NMLZ+IPFV+1PL.SJV+EXIS do-MID
   ‘Máomao found it funny what we had done.’
\end{verbatim}
\end{enumerate}

I take this to indicate that even in (i), the nominalizer is present, but unpronounced, presumably due to a rule of contraction that coalesces it with the proprial determiner. Contractions involving the nominalizer and determiners are common in St’át’imcets, as can be seen in both the examples above: in (i), the clausal nominalizer s= in kwat is unpronounced following the determiner kw, while in (ii) it fuses with the preceding determiner t(a)= to yield ts.
These cases are significant, in that they indicate that unlike bare proper nouns, nominalized proper nouns cannot undergo regular pluralization (since they are not set-denoting); instead, they undergo an associative (additive) plural operation.

Table 1 summarizes the differences between determiners on bare and nominalized proper nouns:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Proprial D</th>
<th>Non-proprial Ds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proper noun in canonical argument position</td>
<td>optional</td>
<td>obligatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proper noun in non-canonical argument position</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>obligatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plural proper noun</td>
<td>* (associative only)</td>
<td>obligatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominalizer s-</td>
<td>obligatory</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2 Nominalized proper names in predicate positions

Aside from argument positions, nominalized proper names occur in a number of different predicative and quasi-predicative environments. While in all of these cases, a determiner is ungrammatical, the presence of the nominalizer itself is more variable, since it is frequently dropped, particularly in initial position. Even when it is missing, however, nominalized proper name predicates differ systematically in interpretation from bare proper noun predicates: while the latter refer to a set of individuals, the former either denote a unique individual or the name of a unique individual. In the following subsections, I describe nominalized proper names in main predicate position (5.2.1), embedded predicate positions (5.2.2), explicit naming contexts (5.2.3), and in apposition (5.2.4).

5.2.1 Nominalized proper nouns as main predicates

Nominalized proper nouns may occur in clause-initial predicate positions followed by a DP argument. Unlike in argument positions, however, the nominalizer is frequently dropped in main predicate position, as can be seen by comparing (38) with (39) and (40) with (41), which are from the same texts, as well as the two instances of a proper name in the same sentence in (42).9

(38) **s-Lúsi** ta=wá7 l=ta=s-q’út-kalh=a.
**NMLZ-Lúsi** DET=IPFV on=DET=NMLZ-side-1PL.POSS=EXIS
‘Lúsi lived beside us.’ (Matthewson 2005:360)

(39) **Q’eselcá7a** ni7 ku=qelhm•émen’.
**Q’eselcá7a** ABSN.DEM DET=old.person•CRED
‘That old woman was Q’eselcá7a.’ (Matthewson 2005:358)

---

9 See also Van Eijk (1997:179), who comments: “Proper nouns are extended with the nominalizer s- when they are used as predicates or complements, although s- is occasionally dropped in less careful speech...”. Dropping of the nominalizer in initial predicate position is not confined to proper names, and is particularly frequent in the Lower (Mount Currie) dialect.
I remember the very first teacher I had: her name was Mrs. Alcock.’

(Matthewson 2005:126)

Beverley Frank

‘My name is Beverley Frank.’

(Matthewson 2005:50)

Another of my names is Tsíxwcen (“Waterfall”), and another is Naxwít (“Snake”).’

(Alexander 2016:193)

Note that there is no distinction in predicate position between nominalized proper names which refer to individuals, as in (39)–(40), and those which refer to their names, as in (40)–(42). As far as I can see, nominalized proper noun predicates are systematically ambiguous between these two uses.

Though examples such as (38), (40), and (42) with an overt nominalizer appear to constitute strong evidence that nominalized proper nouns can occur as predicates, there is a potential alternative source for these structures as reduced clefts, with the initial equational copula nilh elided. Proper nouns occur very frequently in clefts, as shown below, and when they do so, they always lack an introductory determiner (see also (28) above).

‘Mao was the wife of chief Thomas Adolph.’

(Matthewson 2005:357)

‘It was Harold Oleman who drove the little cars (“speeders”) they used on the sections in those days.’

(Alexander 2016:309)

However, nominalized proper names also occur as predicates with clitic subject pronouns:

‘I’m Belinda.’

(Van Eijk 1997:179)
The significance of these examples is that though first and second person clitic pronouns are grammatical with proper noun predicates (47a), they are ungrammatical in clefts (47b, 47c), even though there is nothing semantically anomalous about such structures, as shown in (47d) where a first person singular independent pronoun is optionally preceded by nilh.¹⁰

(47) a.  
Laura=lhkan.  
Laura=1SG.SUBJ  
‘I’m Laura.’

b. *nilh s-Laura=kan.  
COP NMLZ-Laura=1SG.SUBJ

c. *nilh=kan s-Laura.  
COP=1SG.SUBJ NMLZ-Laura

d. (nilh) s-7éntsa s-Laura.  
(COP) NMLZ-1SG.INDP NMLZ-Laura  
‘I’m Laura.’

Since there is no cleft source for a proper name predicate with a subject clitic, these cases show that nominalized proper names in initial position must be treated as genuinely predicative. We will make the further assumption — based on interpretation, as well as the general possibility of restoring the nominalizer when it is missing in cases like (39), (41), and (47a) above — that the nominalizer is underlyingly present on all nominalized proper noun predicates, but may be phonologically elided.

5.2.2 Nominalized proper names as embedded predicates

When we turn to nominalized proper nouns in embedded clauses, we find additional evidence that they may act as predicates. This is because in certain types of subordinate clause they frequently appear following the imperfective auxiliary wa7.¹¹ Normally, wa7 is confined to stage-level predicates (Davis 2011 argues that it selects for an event argument), and is uncommon with nouns, which are typically treated in St’át’imcets as individual-level (permanent) properties.

Sequences of wa7 plus proper noun predicate occur in two types of embedded clause. The first is in relative clauses (most frequently with a demonstrative head, as in (48) and (49) below):

---

¹⁰ Thoma (2007) argues that apparent predicative uses of independent pronouns are always reduced clefts in St’át’imcets.

¹¹ The wa7 in these cases is clearly the imperfective auxiliary rather than the related main predicate meaning ‘be (there)’; the latter selects a subject and a locative complement (typically a PP or locative adverbial) rather than a predicative complement.
(48) \[ \text{nílh=t’u7 s=t’ák=s=t’u7=ti7} \quad \text{kel’q} \]
\[ \text{COP=EXCL NMLZ=go.along=3POSS=EXCL=DEM back.away} \]
\[ \text{[ti7 ta=wá7 s-Paul Spintlum]} \]
\[ \text{[DEM DET=IPFV NMLZ-Paul Spintlum]} \]

’So then he continued to back away, Paul Spintlum...’

(Literally; ‘...that one who was Paul Spintlum’) 

(Lyon and Davis 2018:79)

(49) \[ \text{s7ents [ti=wá7 s-Jack McMillan]} \], \[ \text{ti7 ta=wá7 zús-cal.} \]
\[ \text{1SG.INDP [DET=IPFV NMLZ-Jack McMillan]} \quad \text{DEM DET=IPFV tie-AC} \]

‘I’m Jack MacMillan, the policeman.’

(Literally: ‘...the one that is Jack McMillan’)

(Edwards et al. 2017:177)

(50) \[ \text{zúqw=tu7=ni7 nilh s=melyh-s-as} \quad \text{[ku=wá7} \]
\[ \text{die=REM=ABSN.DEM COP NMLZ=CAUS-3ERG [INV.DET=IPFV} \]
\[ \quad \text{s-John Whimpkins].} \quad \text{NMLZ-John Whimpkins] \}

‘He died, and then she married John Whimpkins.’

(literally: ‘the one who was John Whimpkins’) 

(Matthewson 2005:386)

(51) \[ \text{téxw=t’u7 áma [ni7 ni=wá7 Cecilia]} \]
\[ \text{really=EXCL good [ABSN.DEM ABSN.DET=IPFV Cecilia]} \]
\[ \text{múta7 na=kwtám-t-s=a s-Charlie Harry.} \]
\[ \text{and ABSN.DET=husband-3POSS=EXIS NMLZ-Charlie Harry} \]

‘Cecilia and her husband Charlie Harry were really good people.’

(Literally: ‘that one who was Cecilia’)

(Matthewson 2005:373)

The second is in identificational clauses. Though these superficially resemble clefts, they have a distinct structure, with initial copula \text{nílh} plus a subject and an embedded clause which lacks an introductory determiner. The subject is most usually an encliticized demonstrative pronoun (52), but it may be null, as seen by comparing the otherwise near-identical sentences (53) and (54), and it may also be a full DP, in which case it follows the predicate, as shown in (55).

(52) \[ \text{nílh=ti7 [wa7 s-Frank Gott].} \]
\[ \text{COP=DEM [IPFV NMLZ-Frank Gott]} \]

‘That was Frank Gott.’

(Edwards et al. 2017:301)

(53) \[ \text{nílh=ku7=ni7 [wa7 s-Qatsk].} \]
\[ \text{COP=QUOT=ABSN.DEM [IPFV NMLZ-Qatsk]} \]

‘That was Qatsk.’

(Matthewson 2005:386)

(54) \[ \text{nílh [wa7 s-Qatsk].} \]
\[ \text{COP [IPFV NMLZ-Qatsk]} \]

‘That was Qatsk.’

(Matthewson 2005:386)

\[ \text{12 The determiner here cannot be non-referential } ku=, \text{ which would not be licensed in this environment; instead, I assume it is referential (invisible) } ku=...=a, \text{ with the existential enclitic } =a \text{ contracted with the following auxiliary } wa7, \text{ as is standard in this environment.} \]
The Chinese person who had a store there was Sun Keys. (Mitchell to appear)

In both relative and identificational clauses, auxiliary *wa7 unambiguously picks out a nominalized proper name as predicative. However, the presence of *wa7 also raises some further questions. In particular, why does it occur with proper names, given that it is normally only felicitous with stage-level predicates? And why is it only normally found with proper names in certain subordinate contexts, rather than more generally?

The obvious answer to the first question is that at least in this context, proper names count as *stage-level properties. More precisely, they refer to the relation which holds between an individual and a name at a given time: for example, a relative clause like [ti=wa7 s-Jack McMillan] (as in (49)) means ‘the unique individual who holds/held the name Jack McMillan at the time of evaluation’. The stage-level status of proper names in Stát’ímcets is possibly related to the cultural context of name-bearing in traditional Stát’ímcets society, where names are treated as alienable rather than inalienable possessions of their bearers (see Section 3 above).

This does not, however, answer the second question of why the imperfective auxiliary is limited to proper name predicates in relative and identificational clauses. *Wa7 is usually rejected with main clause proper name predicates, as shown in (56a); compare (56b), with an independent pronoun in main predicate position and the name in a relative clause, and (56c), which features the same structure without a relative clause:

(56) a. *wá7=lhkan s-Qwa7yán’ak
   IPFV=1SG.SUBJ NMLZ-Qwa7yán’ak
   Consultant’s comment: “Not quite: that’s saying you’ve got a blue stomach.” (i.e., the consultant only recognizes the literal meaning qwa<7>y-án’ak blue<INCH>-stomach here: see Section 3 above).

b. s7éntsa [ta=wá7 s-Qwa7yán’ak],
   1SG.INDP [DET=IPFV NMLZ-Qwa7yán’ak]
   ‘I’m Qwa7yán’ak.’ (i.e., my name is Qwa7yán’ak)

c. s7éntsa s-Qwa7yán’ak.
   1SG.INDP NMLZ-Qwa7yán’ak
   ‘I’m Qwa7yán’ak.’ (i.e., my name is Qwa7yán’ak)\(^{13}\)

\(^{13}\) The structure in (56c) is generally preferred to a predicative proper name with a first or second person subject, as in (45)–(46). This is possibly to avoid ambiguity: the nominalizer is frequently dropped, and without an overt nominalizer (as in (47a)), a nominalized proper name looks exactly like a bare (non-nominalized) proper name, though their interpretations are still different (the latter referring to a set rather than an individual). One of our consultants, for example produced the following sentences when asked specifically to differentiate the two interpretations:

(i) Alexander=lhkan.
   Alexander=1SG.SUBJ
   ‘I’m an Alexander.’ (i.e., I’m one of the Alexander family)

(ii) s7éntsa s-Alexander.
   1SG.INDP NMLZ-Alexander
   ‘I’m Alexander.’ (i.e., my name is Alexander)
There appears to be no semantic difference between (56b) and (56c), which begs the question of whether wa7 in cases like (56b) is really marking a stage-level name-bearing property after all. And even if it is, there doesn’t appear to be any reason why it should do so only in certain types of subordinate clause. I have no useful answer to these questions at the moment: structures like (56b) clearly deserve further investigation.

5.3 Nominalized proper names in naming relations

Another set of cases in the literature which have been used (in particular by Matushansky 2008) to argue that proper nouns are underlyingly predicative involves explicit naming contexts. In many languages, including English, proper names occupy the predicate position of small clause complements to naming and nomination verbs, as shown in (57).14

(57) In 1877 they named/proclaimed/entitled [the queen Victoria, Empress of India].

It is unlikely, however, that naming constructions involve a small clause complement in St’át’imcets, because the language seems to lack small clause complements altogether: the clausal complements of causative verbs (‘let’, ‘make’), perception verbs (‘see’, ‘hear’), and verbs of judgment (‘consider, find’) are all full (finite) clauses.

Instead, naming predicates in St’át’imcets are probably better analyzed as ditransitive verbs meaning approximately ‘give y the name x’, which are also attested cross-linguistically (Matushansky 2008:577 fn. 4). As is typical of ditransitives in St’át’imcets and elsewhere in Salish, the goal (the recipient of the name) acts as the direct object of the verb, and is registered on the predicate by object agreement, while the theme (the name) acts as an unregistered secondary object.

Since they are not core arguments, proper names in naming constructions are never introduced by a determiner (see 5.1 above). However, unlike other non-core arguments (e.g., possessors, objects of prepositions), they also often occur without the nominalizer, as in (58)–(59).

(58) nilh kw=s=nah-en-tsál-itas  Cazíl nelh
    COP DET=NMLZ=name-DIR=1SG.OBJ-3PL.ERG Cazíl PL.ABSN.DEM
    ku=n-snek’w•nuk’wa7.
    DET=1SG.POSS-TRED•relative

‘So those relatives of mine named me “Cazíl”.’ (Matthewson 2005:52)

14 Matushansky (2008:596) uses these facts to argue that the lexical entry of proper names includes an extra covert argument position for the naming relation R, as in (i):

(i) λx ∈ Dc. λR(c,n,t) R (x) /ælɩs/
    where n is a sort of the type e (a phonological string)

The basic idea here is that R can be any type of naming relation (baptism, coronation, investiture, etc.), which takes as its first argument a name and its second argument the individual who is so named. This means that [Alice], for example, is an individual who bears some contextually defined naming relation to the name (the phonological string) /ælɩs/. For purposes of exposition, I will ignore this more complex characterization of proper names here.
On the other hand, the nominalizer is not ungrammatical in naming contexts, as shown in (60)–(61); note that the sequence in (61) shows both nominalized and non-nominalized versions of the same name, with the same naming predicate, in two adjacent sentences of the same text.

(60) spukáni7 na=n-ts’qáx7=a wa7 tsún-em s-Q’ayápa7. mouse-coloured ABS.DET=1SG.POSS-horse=EXIS IPFV call+DIR-PASS NMLZ-Q’ayápa7 ‘My horse which was called Q’áyapa7 (“wild horse”) was mouse-coloured.’

(61) a. s-Sáopin wa7 tsún-itas. NMLZ-Sáopin IPFV call+DIR-3PL.ERG ‘She was called Sáopin.’

b. nilh=wi7 s-Josephine ta=sám7=a skwatsits-s COP=EMPH NMLZ-Josephine DET=white.person=EXIS name-3POSS nilh s=wa7 tsún-itas Sáopin. COP NMLZ=IPFV call+DIR-3PL.ERG Sáopin ‘Josephine was her white person’s name, that’s why she was called Sáopin.’

In short, though names in explicit naming contexts are probably best treated as secondary objects of naming predicates rather than the predicates of small clause complements, their ability to occur without the nominalizer is exceptional, and groups them with predicative rather than argumental uses of nominalized proper names.

5.4 Nominalized proper names in apposition

As in English, proper names can be used freely in apposition to arguments in St’át’imcets. When they occur in apposition, they never take determiners, but do optionally occur with the nominalizer, as seen in (62) versus (63), from the same speaker in the same text.

(62) nilh ta=n-sésq’wez’a Gordy múta7 s7i7ents wa7 COP DET=1SG.POSS-younger.sibling=EXIS Gordy and 1SG.INDP IPFV s-mítsa7q l=ta=k’ém’-qs[-ts]=a ta=xzúm=a tíipv]. STAT-sit at=DET=edge-end[-3POSS]=EXIS DET=big=EXIS table ‘My brother Gordy and I were seated at the end of a big table.’ (Matthewson 2005:180)
This pattern looks very similar to predicative contexts with nominalized proper names. The generalization seems to be that in all these cases, the nominalizer is present, but may be optionally dropped.

6 Analysis

In Table 2, I summarize the distributional patterns which have been laid out in previous sections. (The two question marks are contexts which I have not elicited).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BARE (NON-NOMINALIZED)</th>
<th>NOMINALIZED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nominalizer</td>
<td>Determiner</td>
<td>Nominalizer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>core argument</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>common</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>focus of cleft</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>common</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>object of P</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>common</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>possessor</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>common</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>main predicate</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>embedded predicate</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>naming context</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>appositive</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vocative</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some clear generalizations emerge from Table 2. First of all, there is an obvious split between non-nominalized and nominalized proper nouns. The former behave to all intents and purposes like common nouns, suggesting that they should be treated as predicates of type \( e.t \). On the other hand, the latter show the hallmarks of direct reference: as shown in 5.1, they cannot be modified or act as the restrictions of quantifiers, cannot be pluralized except via an associative marker, and take the proprial determiner \( kw= \).

In terms of the predicativist versus direct reference theories of proper names, what is striking about the St’át’imcets facts is that both positions appear to be supported, but via different derivational routes. On the one hand, the predicativist view is strongly supported by non-nominalized names, which behave just like common nouns; on the other hand, when nominalized, proper names show the diagnostic properties of direct reference both in predicate and in argument positions.

Note further that these findings argue against reducing the referential status of (nominalized) proper nouns to the proprial determiner, as argued by Muñoz (to appear). This is because in argument positions the proprial determiner only appears on a subset of nominalized proper nouns, and is optional even there, whereas nominalization itself is in strict complementary distribution with common noun determiners, and is obligatory.

The most obvious way to model this behavior is to treat all proper nouns as underlyingly predicative, and give the nominalizer the job of picking out a unique individual. Determiners will
then do their usual job of converting the resulting predicates into arguments, with the proprial
determiner restricted to predicates which denote unique individuals.

Employing a predicativist lexical entry for a proper name such as ‘John’ as in (64), repeated
from (1), we might then give the nominalizer a lexical entry such as that in (65).

(64) \[[\text{John}]\] = \(\lambda x. x \text{ bears the name } /\text{jan}/\)

(65) \[[s-] = \lambda P_{(e,t)} \lambda x : \exists! \lambda x (P(x) = 1) . P\]

Only defined if \(P\) is a proper name

However, this line of analysis has a serious shortcoming: it fails to generalize from proper
nouns to other cases of lexical nominalization. Nominalization in St’át’imcets, as in other Salish
languages, is pervasive: even setting aside cases of phrasal (predicate) and clausal (propositional)
nominalization, lexical nominalization applies to a large subset (approximately a third) of
\textit{common} nouns. This suggests that it is fulfilling a broader function than that defined in (65),
particularly since on common nouns, it clearly does not have a uniqueness function — with or
without the nominalizer, nominal predicates based on common nouns denote sets:

(66) \(\text{s-qaycw} \quad \text{ta}=\text{wá}7 \quad \text{tsunám’-cal} \\text{lání7} \quad \text{ku}=\text{time}.\)

\text{NMLZ-man} \quad \text{DET}=\text{IPFV} \quad \text{teach-ACT} \quad \text{ABSN.DEM} \quad \text{DET}=\text{time}

‘The teacher was a man at that time.’

Accordingly, I’d like to pursue a different line, maintaining a more general role for
nominalization, and locating the difference between proper nouns and common nouns (the latter
including bare proper nouns construed as sets rather than individuals) in the lexicon. More
specifically, I propose that in St’át’imcets proper names are lexically ambiguous. On the one
hand, a non-nominalized name like ‘John’ can be given a predicativist lexical entry of type \(\langle e,t \rangle\)
such as (64); on the other hand, the same name can also be lexically represented as a referential
expression of type \(e\), as in (7), repeated below as (67):

(67) \[[\text{John}]\] = John

This, however, leaves the function of nominalization on proper nouns unexplained. In order
to provide an explanation, I will make one more assumption, motivated by the extreme
“predicative” behavior of all nouns in St’át’imcets, which in terms of the nominal typology of
Chierchia (1998) must be classed as a pure [+pred, -arg] system. This is embodied in the claim in
(68):

(68) \textit{All nouns in St’át’imcets must enter the syntax as predicates}

Now, this allows non-nominalized predicative proper nouns with the representation in (66) to
enter the derivation freely, but causes a problem for the alternative representation in (67) where a
proper noun is of type \(e\) rather than \(\langle e,t \rangle\), necessitating a further operation which shifts it into a
predicative type in order to allow it to enter the syntax. It is this operation which I’d like to claim

\footnote{This is of course the crudest possible direct reference representation of a proper noun. A more
sophisticated approach such as that of e.g. Muñoz (to appear) models direct reference via a set of “rigid”
assignments of indices to worlds.}
is the semantic reflex of “nominalization” on a proper noun.\footnote{In fact, more generally, I’d like to claim that the nominalizer is a general-purpose \textit{predicativizer}, which appears whenever it is necessary to abstract over an argument to create a derived predicate. Of course, it is well beyond the scope of this paper to explore this hypothesis in any detail.}

It is important to remember that even when acting as a predicate, a nominalized proper noun retains its referential character, in contrast to a regular (non-nominalized) proper noun. The nominalizer, in other words, needs to create an identity predicate which retains the character of the original entity-referring proper noun. (69) — essentially Partee’s (1986) operation Ident — is one way to do so.

\begin{equation}
\lambda x. \lambda y. [x = y] \quad \text{Only defined if } x \text{ is a proper name}
\end{equation}

Applied to a proper name like ‘John’ under its referential guise, the result will be as in (72).

\begin{equation}
\lambda y. [\text{John} = y]
\end{equation}

The nominalized proper noun predicate will then either combine with a subject to yield a proposition, or alternatively may combine with the proprial determiner to yield an argument. Under this view, the proprial determiner itself contributes little semantically: its job is simply to type-shift a nominalized predicate back into an argument of type $e$.\footnote{There remain a number of open questions about the proprial determiner. One of them concerns its restricted distribution, which includes only “canonical” argument positions, and excludes, e.g., possessors and objects of prepositions. In addition, unlike other determiners, the proprial determiner is optional. It seems likely to me that both of these facts are linked to its very limited semantic contribution: under the account given here, the referential properties of proper names with the proprial determiner are not attributed to the determiner itself, but to the lexical entry of the proper name under its “direct reference” guise in (69).}

But what about the nominalizer on \textit{common} nouns? To put it bluntly, if the nominalizer really is a general purpose predicativizer, and common nouns are lexically predicative, there should be no reason why they should ever take the nominalizer.

One possible solution to this problem, outlined in (Davis 2018a), is to take a neo-Carlsonian view of common nouns as names of \textit{kinds} of type $e$, with the nominalizer then corresponding to Chierchia’s (1998) \textit{up} operator, whose job is to convert a kind to a predicate of type $\langle e,t \rangle$. In that case, the nominalizer would maintain its core function as a predicativizer, but apply differently to the two sortal domains of individuals (proper nouns) and kinds (common nouns), with correspondingly different results.\footnote{Chierchia (1998) distinguishes proper nouns from common nouns, specifically rejecting a neo-Carlsonian analysis for proper nouns on the grounds that they refer to individuals rather than kinds, and therefore cannot map to predicates via the \textit{up} operator. However, this raises a problem for my analysis of proper nouns in their bare (predicativist) guise. On the one hand, if they were just like common nouns (and were therefore derived from kinds), we’d expect them to be nominalized, contrary to fact. On the other hand, there is no way to derive them from the domain of individuals (names) without using the nominalizer, either, and in any case, that would give us the wrong meaning (a referential one). The only solution I can think of currently is to appeal to a parallel Ident operation to (71), but which yields a predicate true of the set of individuals who bear a proper name, and crucially is not realized as the nominalizer (i).}

16 In fact, more generally, I’d like to claim that the nominalizer is a general-purpose \textit{predicativizer}, which appears whenever it is necessary to abstract over an argument to create a derived predicate. Of course, it is well beyond the scope of this paper to explore this hypothesis in any detail.

17 There remain a number of open questions about the proprial determiner. One of them concerns its restricted distribution, which includes only “canonical” argument positions, and excludes, e.g., possessors and objects of prepositions. In addition, unlike other determiners, the proprial determiner is optional. It seems likely to me that both of these facts are linked to its very limited semantic contribution: under the account given here, the referential properties of proper names with the proprial determiner are not attributed to the determiner itself, but to the lexical entry of the proper name under its “direct reference” guise in (69).

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(i) If PN is the domain of proper names of type $e$, then
\[
\text{PN} \iff \lambda x. \lambda y. [y \text{ bears the name } x]
\]

I leave a more satisfying solution for future work.
7 Conclusion

This paper brings together two apparently very different kinds of research: the centuries-old philosophical debate concerning the proper semantic treatment of proper names; and the much less antique tradition of semantic fieldwork on American indigenous languages (more specifically on Salish, and more specifically still on St’át’ímcets). I hope to have shown they have things to say to each other. On the one hand, cross-linguistic data — particularly from culturally and linguistically diverse languages — should help to frame the philosophical debate by showing us the empirical range of possible structures and interpretations for proper names in natural language. On the other hand, the theoretical sophistication of the semantic tradition should sharpen our analytical tools as fieldworkers, demanding answers to questions that we never thought to ask.

The analysis here leaves much to be desired, both theoretically and empirically: I hope, however, it is a step in the right direction.

References


