There and Back Again: qəji in γayγajuθəm (Comox-Sliammon)

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Abstract: *qəji* 'again'/'still', a possible presupposition trigger in ?ay?ajuθəm, appears to not encode the same presuppositional restrictions as in English and does not assume the presuppositional content to be in the common ground. These findings provide support for Gauker's (1998) theory of presuppositions as well as Koch's (2011) Presupposition Constraint.

Keywords: Comox-Sliammon, presupposition, pragmatics

1 Introduction

This paper will investigate the patterns associated with $q\partial ji$ 'again'/'still', which is a possible presupposition trigger in ?ay?ajuθəm (Central Salish), and compare it to potential presupposition triggers in St'át'imcets (Interior Salish). ?ay?ajuθəm is a critically endangered language traditionally spoken in the Tla'amin, K'ómoks, Klahoose, and Homalco communities with approximately 47 fluent speakers (FPCC 2018). Matthewson (2006) proposes that presupposition triggers in St'át'imcets, such as hu7 'more,' do not encode the same presuppositional restrictions as in English, where the presuppositional content is assumed to be in the common ground. This paper finds that the possible presupposition trigger $q\partial ji$ in ?ay?ajuθəm patterns similarly to presupposition triggers in St'át'imcets because the content is not assumed to be in the common ground. This paper also suggests that Koch's (2011) proposed Presupposition Constraint may also apply to ?ay?ajuθəm, which would explain the lack of $q\partial ji$ attested in a discourse-initial position.

2 Literature review

A presupposition is a linguistic phenomenon in which a speaker takes for granted that the hearer knows certain information (Beaver & Geurts 2014). For example, in English, definite determiners presuppose that there is a unique and salient individual as the referent (Birner 2012). The sentence *The King of France is wise* presupposes that there exists some individual who is the King of France (Birner 2012:159).

Presuppositions have two characteristic behaviours. First, presuppositions are not introduced as new information. The sentence *I need to go home to feed my dog* in English presupposes that the speaker has a dog. More specifically, the speaker assumes that this is information the hearer also knows. Presuppositions thus occupy the space known as the common ground, an area of shared information between listener and hearer (von Fintel 2000), which was first proposed by Stalnaker (1974) (cited in Matthewson 2006).

Another behaviour that presuppositions have is that they are retained under negation, while entailments, another pragmatic phenomenon, are not (Birner 2012). An entailment is a conclusion derived from a premise in which the conclusion cannot be true if the premise is false

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(Birner 2012). For example, the premise *I own three cars* entails *I own two cars*. There is no situation in which the entailment is false and the premise is true. The sentence *I don't need to feed my dog today* still presupposes that the speaker has a dog. In comparison, entailments are cancelled through negation. For example, the statement *My wife has been kidnapped* gives rise to the entailment that somebody has been kidnapped, but the statement *My wife hasn't been kidnapped* does not convey the entailment that somebody has been kidnapped (Birner 2012). This follows a larger behaviour pattern where presuppositions can "project through certain operators" (Matthewson 2006:3) including, but not limited to, negation.

In order for presupposition use to be felicitous, both the speaker and hearer must know about the presuppositional content; in other words, the presupposition must be in the common ground. When the hearer does not know about this specific content, this is considered to be presupposition failure. There are two responses to presupposition failure. The hearer may challenge the speaker using a "Hey, wait a minute!" response to address the presupposition itself, or the hearer may instead accommodate the presupposition into their common ground and accept the presuppositional content without challenging it (von Fintel 2008).

However, presuppositions may not necessarily be a crosslinguistic phenomenon. This section will specifically look at presuppositional content in Salish languages.

Research into presuppositional content in Salish languages has focused primarily on determiners, words that trigger presuppositions, and focus marking. Firstly, Salish determiners do not presuppose that there is a single salient individual in the common ground. Matthewson (1996) first posits that no Salish language has a determiner system with a clear distinction between definiteness and indefiniteness (cited in Cable 2008). Matthewson (1999) continues that determiners in St'át'imcets are indefinite and do not carry a presupposition of uniqueness (cited in Cable 2008).

Secondly, and perhaps most saliently, Matthewson (2006) suggests that presupposition triggers in St'át'imcets do not behave as English presupposition triggers do. Presupposition triggers are lexical items that call to attention a presupposition embedded within an utterance. Examples of presupposition triggers in English include determiners, such as the, and iterative words, such as again. In English, using definite determiners embeds the presupposition that there is a salient, unique individual that both the speaker and the hearer know about; thus, this knowledge is in the common ground. Again embeds the presupposition that the action or event has occurred at least once in addition to the asserted event. For example, in the sentence I went to Hawaii again, the presupposition would be that the speaker has been to Hawaii at least once already. In St'át'imcets, words such as again or also do not assume that the hearer has the presuppositional content of these words in their common ground. In this way, words such as hu7 'more' and t'it 'also' can be used in contexts infelicitous in English because the presuppositional content is assumed to be known by the speaker. Matthewson analyses the lack of "Hey, wait a minute!" responses as support for Gauker's theory that "the speaker's presuppositions are merely the speaker's own take on the propositional content" (Gauker 1998, cited in Matthewson 2006:9). This means that the speaker does not take for granted that the hearer already knows the presuppositional content encoded in the words.

Next, research on Salish languages also establishes that focus marking may not assume presuppositions are known in the common ground. Koch's (2011) paper on Nłe?kepmxcin argues that presuppositions do not hold the hearer to the presuppositional content, and looks specifically at focus marking (Koch 2011). His paper finds that speakers are free to use focus marking independent of the discourse, such as using "narrow focus-marking discourse-initially" (Koch 2011). However, he finds that while overuse of focus marking is possible, speakers avoid using focus marking to generate presuppositions without "overt evidence" to mark that

presuppositional content is in the common ground (Koch 2011). Koch calls this restriction on presupposition generation the "Presupposition Constraint".

In his grammar on $\frac{2}{3}$ $\frac{2}{3}$ $\frac{1}{9}$ $\frac{1}{9$

The presupposition encoded in *again* in English is that the content of the proposition has occurred at least once before. In example (1), the presupposition triggered by *again* in English is that you have dug clams there at least once before.¹

(1) qaqa-h-as k^w=qaya ?ulq^wu=čx^w=ga tan=**qji**.
low.tide-epen-3CNJ DET=water dig.clams=2SG.INDC=CLT DEM=again
'When the tide is low, you dig clams there again.' [Watanabe 2003:103]

This paper will look at whether this presupposition is also maintained in ?ay?ajuθəm.

In addition, Harris (1981) recorded Mrs. Marie Clifton, a fluent speaker of Island Comox, a related dialect. In one of their recordings, Harris elicited the phrase *He is sleeping*, and one of the two sentences that Mrs. Clifton volunteered had $q \partial j i$ initially. Harris translated it as *He's still sleeping*, to which Mrs. Clifton agreed. However, I considered it an object of interest that $q \partial j i$ was used productively and discourse-initially without having a specific context that both the speaker and the hearer knew about.

3 Methodology

I elicited with one speaker, Joanne Francis, over two sessions. The methodology for this experiment was based on the methodology in Matthewson (2006). She used four different methodologies to attempt to elicit "Hey, wait a minute" responses. I borrowed two elements of Matthewson's methodology, "asking consultants to translate English discourses containing wait-a-minute responses" and "attempting to construct wait-a-minute responses in St'át'imcets and asking consultants to judge discourses containing them" (Matthewson 2006:4–5). I combined these two methodologies by using storyboards to elicit sentences with and without $q \neq ji$, and then asking for judgments for these sentences' grammaticality in different contexts.

Storyboards were used in two different ways.

¹ Abbreviations used in this paper include the following: ACT – active, CAUS – causative, CL.DEM – clausal demonstrative CLT – clitic, CNJ – conjunctive, CTR – control transitive, DEM – demonstrative, DET – determiner, ERG – ergative, EXCL – exclusive, FUT – future, INDC – indicative, INTR – intransitive, MD – middle, NCTR – non-control transitive, NMLZ – nominalizer, PASS – passive, PL – plural, PRO – pronoun, RPT – reportative, SBJ – subject, SG – singular, STAT – stative. A hyphen (-) represents an affix boundary, an equal sign (=) represents a clitic boundary, and a dot (•) represents reduplication boundary.

I showed two minimally different contexts with storyboard pairs. One pair of storyboards would follow a similar context with slight differences. One storyboard would show an event occurring for the first time. These storyboards are labelled (a), along with the specific storyboard number. The other storyboard would show an event occurring twice over a certain duration of time. These storyboards are labelled (b) along with the storyboard's number. I elicited two $\alpha = \alpha = \alpha$ sentences with an English prompt for the minimal differences, and then asked if I could use the $\alpha = \alpha$ sentence with the repetitive reading to describe the event occurring for the first time. This methodology used seven storyboards.

I showed one context occurring for the first time, volunteered a sentence in English and $2ay2aju\theta$ am (the $2ay2aju\theta$ am sentence had qaji included, while its English equivalent had again included), and asked if the $2ay2aju\theta$ am sentence was felicitous in this context. This methodology used ten storyboards.

In these methodologies, I attempted to elicit the $2ay2aju\theta$ m word for *again* by providing it consistently in the English prompt. Due to difficulties hearing the schwa epenthesis, I have recorded all instances of qji as qaji for the purposes of this paper. Later revision of this topic can better distinguish these two forms, but due to these morphemes' similarities, this paper will assume that qji behaves similarly to qaji and will be recorded accordingly.

4 Data

The data are largely compromised of volunteered forms and grammaticality judgments of accepted forms. Using the first methodology with storyboards allowed me to construct minimal pairs with and without $q \neq ji$.

In example (2) from storyboard 2, Laurie is giving Henry coffee for the first time because he is tired.

(2) χan-at-əm=kwa=səm Laurie Henry coffee. give-CTR-PASS=RPT=FUT Laurie Henry coffee 'Laurie gave Henry coffee.'

In example (3), Laurie is giving coffee to Henry for the second time. The consultant volunteered to repeat the context (Henry is tired because he stayed up late birdwatching), so the context is included.

- (3) a. hu kwə-t-əm-uł Laurie Henry. go see-CTR-PASS-PST Laurie Henry 'Laurie went to go see Henry.'
 - b. birdwatching-uł=kwa Henry. birdwatching-PST=RPT Henry 'Henry was birdwatching.'
 - c. hu=kwa=səm Laurie χan-at-as **qəji** Henry coffee. go=RPT=FUT Laurie give-CTR-3ERG again Henry coffee 'Laurie went to give Henry coffee again.'

The minimal pair is echoed in (2) and (3c). There are slight differences in meaning ('Laurie gave Henry coffee' versus 'Laurie went to give Henry coffee again'), but *qəji* 'again' provides the significant difference between the two examples.

After eliciting the minimal pair of sentences, I then asked my consultant if I could use the sentence with the 'again/still' reading to describe the situation where something was happening for the first time. For example, in storyboard 1a, Laurie has a sore throat, and that is the whole context. In storyboard 1b, Laurie has a sore throat, recovers, and then becomes sick again because of her roommate. I asked my consultant if I could use the sentence *I have a sore throat again* in ?ay?ajuθəm to describe the first situation, if I have a sore throat for the first time. Over seven storyboards with minimally different contexts, my consultant offered *qəji* 'again'/'still' sentences to describe a context happening for the first time.

However, q = ji was not consistently defined as 'again' within the sentences elicited with the first seven storyboards. In storyboard 4, q = ji was used productively with two different readings, although the prompted English sentence used again only once.

- (4) a. ?əm•?imaš čəni higa Art kw=qwit.
 PL•walk 1SG.PRO and Art DET=beach
 'Art and I were walking on the beach.'
 - b. kwən-əxw-ul=c mimaw higa kw=canu. see-NCTR-PST=1SG.SBJ cat and DET=dog 'I saw a cat and a dog.'
 - c. ?aq-at-əm čanu mimaw. chase-CTR-PASS dog cat 'The dog chased the cat.'
- (5) a. ?əm•?imaš-uł čəni higa Art kw=qwit.

 PL•walk-PST 1SG.PRO and Art DET=beach
 'Art and I were walking on the beach.'
 - b. kwən-əxw-ul=č canu qəji. see-NCTR-PST=1SG.SBJ dog again 'I saw the dog again.'
 - c. qəji=?ut ?aq·?aq-at-as mimaw. again=EXCL PL·chase-CTR-3ERG cat 'He was still chasing the cat.'

In example (5c), the reading of $q \ni ji$ is given the 'still' reading, with the dog still chasing the cat, while example (5b) has the reading of 'again', with $q \ni ji$ following the noun $\dot{c}anu$ 'dog'.

In addition, the usage of $q \not j i$ does not appear to be restricted to having one action be completed before 'again' can be used to describe the second iteration of the action in focus. In storyboard 1b, the sentence elicited was Laura had a sore throat, got better, and then got sick again. Interestingly, the direct translation from $2ay2aju\theta$ in (6a) does not appear to have any mention of Laura recovering before becoming sick again.

(6) a. ?ah-łał-st-əm=kwa Laurie sayłał s tłukw. sore-throat-CAUS-PASS=CL.DEM Laurie throat NMLZ today 'Laurie was sick through today.'

b. χəpj-əx^w-as k^wət-əm=s s t̄θuk̄w **qəji**. return-NCTR-3ERG get-sick-MD=3POSS NMLZ today again 'Laurie has her sore throat return again today.'

Lastly, the meaning of *qaji* appears to extend beyond 'again' and 'still'. In storyboard 3b, *qaji* was given a habitual reading. In this context, Gloria is helping Laura with Laura's schoolwork. While Gloria is not directly mentioned in the consultant's volunteered sentence, she is mentioned in the context. For this storyboard, the consultant volunteered the sentence in example (7) and was then asked to translate it back.

(7) čag-a-t-as Laura qəji. help-CTR-3ERG Laura again 'Gloria likes to help Laura with schoolwork all the time.'

Here, $q \ni i$ was given a habitual reading ('all the time') rather than its anticipated meaning 'still' or 'again'.

In these contexts, $q \ni ji$ -inclusion was not obligatory. For storyboard 4, the consultant provided two sentence forms, one with $q \ni ji$ and one without. Table (1) below shows the occurrences when $q \ni ji$ was present or not present in the consultant's sentences.

Methodology 1	<i>qəji</i> not included	<i>qəji</i> included
1		✓
2		✓
3	✓	
4	✓ (2 forms provided)	✓ (2 forms provided)
5		✓
6		✓
7		✓

Table 1: *qaji* inclusion in Methodology 1 provided sentences

There was one context in which $q \ni i$ was consistently removed, even after attempts of reinsertion. Only the form without $q \ni i$ was provided by the consultant.

For the second methodology, the nature of the contexts changed slightly. These contexts more explicitly emphasized the "first" nature of events in a more extreme way, compared to the contexts in the first methodology. For these examples, I introduced the context showed in the storyboard and described the action in focus which was happening for the first time. I had prepared a sentence in $\frac{2}{3}$ $\frac{2}{1}$ $\frac{1}{1}$ $\frac{1$

For one storyboard, there is a photograph of someone knitting. The context is that my grandmother is going to teach me how to knit, although I have never learned how to knit before. My grandmother says to me:

(8) tiwš-am-stu-mi=tθəm qəji. learn-MDL-CAU-2SG.OBJ=1SG.INDC+FUT again 'I will teach you again.'

I then asked the consultant if this is an acceptable sentence to say given the context. The consultant had two options: (i) either to explicitly accept or reject the provided sentence or (ii) repeat the sentence back to me with alternations. For the ten storyboards and sentences I had prepared, the consultant altered the majority to make them sound more natural. If the consultant provided an altered sentence, I would insert *qaji* if it was not already present and ask if this sentence could be used to describe the context occurring for the first time.

Out of the ten storyboards, in every context one could use *qaji* to describe an event happening for the first time. However, there were stronger judgments on whether this was a sentence that the consultant herself would use. This introduces the differentiation between a form that is acceptable to use versus a form that a native speaker would prefer to use.

The table below records instances when $q \partial ji$ was deleted or left in for Methodology 2.

Context: Methodology 2	<i>q∂ji</i> removed	<i>qəji</i> included
8	✓	
9	✓	
10	✓	
11	√ ("that's better")	
12	✓	
13	✓	
14		✓
15	?	
16	✓	
17	N/A – was not able to p	provide ?ay?ajuθəm sentence

Table 2: *qəji* removal and inclusion in Methodology 2 provided sentences

Looking at the table, seven out of the eight storyboards that had explicit removal or inclusion had $q \partial \tilde{t}$ removed out of the provided $q \partial \tilde{t}$ and $q \partial \tilde{t}$ removed out of the provided $q \partial \tilde{t}$ and $q \partial \tilde{t}$ removed out of the provided $q \partial \tilde{t}$ and $q \partial \tilde{t}$ removed out of the provided $q \partial \tilde{t}$ and $q \partial \tilde{t}$ removed out of the provided $q \partial \tilde{t}$ and $q \partial \tilde{t}$ removed out of the provided $q \partial \tilde{t}$ and $q \partial \tilde{t}$ removed out of the provided $q \partial \tilde{t}$ and $q \partial \tilde{t}$ removed out of the provided $q \partial \tilde{t}$ and $q \partial \tilde{t}$ removed out of the provided $q \partial \tilde{t}$ removed out of $q \partial \tilde{t}$ removed

Often when $q \partial ji$ was removed, other adverbs would be included in the sentences. In storyboard 13, I had a photograph of an angry child, and the context was that this was my younger cousin who I had never met before. However, the first time that I met this cousin, the child ran up and kicked me immediately. I gave the English sentence She kicked me again and the $\frac{\partial j}{\partial x}$ After hearing this, the consultant gave the sentence:

(9) θ -kw=yəm- θ -as hiya. bad-very child DET=kick-CTR-3ERG quickly 'The naughty child kicked me right away.'

In the consultant's volunteered sentence, $q \ni i$ was omitted, and additional details (e.g. adjectives describing the child's naughtiness) were added.

Another context showed that $q \ni j$ was omitted in favor of a different temporal adverb to describe a past event. This context was a photograph of cooked octopus, and Marianne was going to eat it despite never having eaten it before. I gave the English sentence *Marianne eats octopus again* and the $?ay?aju\theta \ni m$ sentence $m \ni k^w tas$ *Marianne ta?qwa qəji*. After hearing this, the consultant gave the sentence:

(10) məkw-t-əm-?uł Marianne ta?qwa sjəsuł. eat-CTR-PASS-PST Marianne octopus yesterday 'Marianne ate octopus yesterday.'

In this sentence (10), q = ji is omitted in favor of the word sj = sul 'yesterday', which changes the meaning of the sentence. Here, Marianne has eaten octopus yesterday rather than eating it again.

However, when I reinserted $q \partial j i$ into her volunteered sentence to ask for acceptability judgments, she approved all ten of these sentences, although their acceptability rating was more variable (e.g. with context 4, she said her version without $q \partial j i$ sounded better).

For storyboard 12, I specifically chose an ungrammatical sentence from Watanabe (2003)'s grammar where the example used a non-stative form with *qəji* rather than a stative form. This context was designed to see if some form of correction would occur. The sentence I elicited was in English, *A gust of wind suddenly blows again*, along with the ungrammatical ?ay?ajuθəm sentence *qəji ?ut hawp*. My consultant repeated the sentence back to me, changing its meaning to an ongoing reading rather than a sudden action.

(11) qəji=?ut puh?im ?asq s ča?at. still=EXCL blow-ACT.INTR<STAT> outside NMLZ now 'It is still blowing outside now.'

Lastly, one storyboard touched on the idea of truth-conditions. In the context for storyboard 14, a customer is talking to a waiter at a café. I explained that the customer had ordered a coffee, and now wanted some water. I provided the English sentence *Can I have water again?* and the $\frac{\partial u}{\partial t}$ and $\frac{\partial u}{\partial t}$ would be an acceptable phrase to say in this context, and also produced her own sentence with $\frac{\partial u}{\partial t}$.

In summation, the data provided by my consultant was a combination of volunteered forms with $q \ni ji$ and accepted forms from sentences with $q \ni ji$ inserted. Table 3 below shows a summary of which contexts had volunteered forms (VF) and which ones had accepted forms (AF) for Methodology 1.

	Methodology 1	Scenario 1: First Time	Scenario 2: Happening Twice
_	1	AF	VF
	2	AF	VF
	3	AF	AF
	4	AF	VF
	5	AF	VF
	6	VF	VF
	7	AF	VF

Table 3: Methodology 1 – Comparing AF and VF of sentences containing qəji

For six out of the seven contexts, $q \ni ji$ was not volunteered to describe an action happening for the first time. For storyboard 6a, where $q \ni ji$ has been volunteered, the context is a man walking around and seeing a deer. The sentence volunteered by my consultant is translated back into English as *The man was still walking*, with $q \ni ji$ meaning 'still' here. This context introduces the interesting question of what scope $q \ni ji$ can take.

For six out of the seven contexts, $q \ni ji$ was volunteered to describe an action happening for the second time. For storyboard 3b, $q \ni ji$ was consistently omitted from volunteered sentences.

Table 4 below provides a summary of which contexts had volunteered forms and which ones had accepted forms for Methodology 2.

Methodology 2	Scenario 1: First Time
8	AF
9	AF
10	AF ~ VF
11	AF
12	AF ~ VF
13	AF
14	AF ~ VF
15	AF
16	AF
17	AF

Table 4: Methodology 2 – Comparing AF and VF of sentences containing qaji

For ten out of the ten contexts, sentences including $q \ni ji$ were accepted. Three out of the ten contexts had $q \ni ji$ -inserted forms, although there was variation for how the $q \ni ji$ was included. In storyboard 10, there was no volunteered form, as the form provided was repeated as felicitous by the consultant. Storyboard 14 had the provided form deemed acceptable, but the consultant also provided another sentence using $q \ni ji$ that she would also say. Lastly, for storyboard 12, the consultant changed the meaning of the sentence to felicitously include $q \ni ji$. For seven of the ten contexts, the provided form was accepted and the consultant volunteered alternate sentences without $q \ni ji$ that she would say.

5 Analysis

This data suggests that $q \ni ji$ may not impose the same restrictions on the common ground as its English equivalents 'again' or 'still'. The first part of this analysis will look at the lack of "Hey, wait a minute!" responses, while the second part of this analysis will examine the usage of $q \ni ji$ as a volunteered form versus as an accepted form. The third part of this analysis will compare different theories of presuppositions to explain this phenomenon.

Firstly, these storyboards attempted to create an infelicitous context for using 'again'/'still', either by initially eliciting sentences or using Watanabe (2003)'s grammar as a baseline for sentence production. The situations given created cases of potential presupposition failure where a presupposition that an event had already occurred once should not be felicitous in a context where the event has not occurred more than once. These specific contexts should trigger a "Hey, wait a minute!" response in English, which would have the speaker challenge the presupposition assumed to be in the common ground by using metalinguistic negation. However,

my consultant did not give any of these responses or reject sentences based on the inclusion of $q \ni ji$. In all 17 cases that I asked for a $q \ni ji$ sentence to describe an event that was happening for the first time, she found every instance to be acceptable.

This could suggest that my consultant might not be producing "Hey, wait a minute" responses because she may be unwilling to correct me. However, this is not the case. She has corrected me in past elicitations with my pronunciation or for dictionary entries with words, e.g. the word $q'''opo\theta\epsilon n$ means 'bearded' rather than 'puckered lips'. In addition, she also corrected me during these two elicitation sessions, such as saying that one sentence without $q\partial ji$ was better than the sentence with $q\partial ji$.

Secondly, two different methodologies were used to examine different aspects of qaji usage. The first methodology presented minimally different contexts to elicit sentences using qaji and sentences without, while the second methodology used aji0 as sentences to try and use aji1 discourse-initially within a structured context. These two methodologies presented almost identical findings where in seventeen out of seventeen cases, aji1 could be used to describe an event happening even though it did not necessarily happen before.

Thirdly, there is a difference between the volunteered form that the consultant gave versus the accepted form of sentences. The consultant productively produced $q \neq ji$ for the first methodology primarily where there was the clear reading that this event was happening again. The consultant also removed *qaji* from ?ay?ajuθəm sentences that I had created in order to show how she would describe a situation. The consultant did produce qaji at the beginning of one context, for storyboard 6, to describe a man "still walking". This suggests that although qəji may be acceptable in certain contexts, it may not be productive to describe events occurring for the first time. The example of Mrs. Clifton from Harris' (1981) recordings providing qəji without a specific elicitation context suggests that it may be productive as long as an acceptable context can be mentally created where the presupposition might be true. This analysis would require that qəji and other presuppositions would have to be accommodated then, but this analysis would then predict that "Hey, wait a minute!" responses should also be possible in discourse scenarios. Although the consultant was not able to produce "Hey, wait a minute!" responses due to the format of the elicitation session, she did pass judgments on sentences and contexts. The closest to a "Hey, wait a minute" response that was recorded was the consultant offering an alternate sentence and saying that this option was better than the one I had provided, although "Hey, wait a minute!" responses should be possible in real-life discourse.

Lastly, the definition of $q \ni ji$ appears to be rather flexible. In some instances, my consultant was asked to translate the sentences she produced in $2ay2aju\theta$ back into English. Some of the translations used 'again' or 'still', attesting that there is some form of multiple readings, although the phonological difference could not be attested here. In addition, a habitual reading in example (7) was given with $q \ni ji$, suggesting that its meaning could be broader than the two definitions listed above. In contrast, some of the English translations did not address the presence of $q \ni ji$. For example, storyboard 9 was of a father putting his baby to sleep for the first time. When my consultant was asked to translate an $2ay2aju\theta$ sentence meaning 'The mother is telling the grandmother that the father is putting the baby down again' to English, she gave the translation The mother's telling Granny that the father's going to put the baby down to sleep. Although $q \ni ji$ was included in the $2ay2aju\theta$ wersion, its corresponding meaning 'again'/'still' was omitted in the English translation. This omission occurred several times, such as the example in (7).

It is also worthwhile noting the specific contexts used for $q \ni ji$ that resulted either in volunteered forms or "I would say this" responses. For two out of the three contexts used in Methodology 2 that had $q \ni ji$ volunteered, two of them were imitating responses in a conversation, while many of the other contexts were descriptive in nature. This suggests that the use of $q \ni ji$

could be discourse-sensitive and appear more natural in conversations rather than describing events. In addition, *qəji* was occasionally replaced with temporal adverbs, such as *sjasul* 'yesterday' in (10) and *hiya* 'right away' (in example 9). Since the meaning of 'again' is inherently linked with time (e.g. something happening "before"), it appears that these adverbs could be interchangeable given existing information. If the speaker knows that Marianne ate octopus yesterday, it might be more felicitous to state all information known on the subject rather than replacing *yesterday* with a more general adverb *again*.

In all cases, these examples provide convincing evidence that $q \ni ji$ does not behave similarly to its English equivalent. The contexts provided would trigger a "Hey, wait a minute" response in English but did not in $?ay?aju\theta \Rightarrow m$. The evidence also suggests that $q \ni ji$ may not have as direct a translation in English as once thought, as $q \ni ji$ can be given a habitual reading or even completely omitted in $?ay?aju\theta \Rightarrow m$ to English translations.

This evidence could be seen as supporting the adoption of Gauker's theory that presuppositions are held to be a speaker's take on propositional content rather than the adoption of Stalnaker's theory, where presuppositions are held to be in the common ground (Gauker 1998, cited in Matthewson 2006). Gauker's theory accurately predicts the lack of challenges towards presuppositional content in that the hearer is not expected to know the presuppositional content (Gauker 1998, cited in Matthewson 2006). For contexts such as *The father is putting the baby down again*, the hearer is not required to know that the father is putting the baby down at all. Instead, the hearer is being told the speaker's take on the situation. This theory also accurately predicts the lack of "Hey, wait a minute" responses. These responses occur when the hearer is presumed to know the presuppositional content, but does not.

However, Gauker (1998)'s theory does not explain the instances of $q \partial ji$ deletion. For example, one context with $q \partial ji$ deletion was Daniel adopting a new puppy, bringing it home, and then saying, *I will feed the dog again*. In this situation, the consultant said that the sentence she produced without $q \partial ji$ sounded "much better". It could be argued that semantics play a part in explaining the ungrammaticality of using $q \partial ji$ here, in that Daniel could not truthfully say that he was going to feed his dog again when he had not yet fed it once. In addition, for example (7), the sentence *Gloria likes to help Laura with her schoolwork* is a reportative statement reflecting the speaker's belief that Gloria does like to help Laura with her schoolwork. It would be predicted that $q \partial ji$ would be acceptable here since it communicates the speaker's opinion, but $q \partial ji$ was removed consistently from its ∂ji 000 equivalent.

Instead, it appears that this data supports Koch's (2011) theory of the "Presupposition Constraint" in Salish languages. While presuppositions do not impose the same knowledge restraints on hearers, there may be a conventional restraint on speakers to avoid use of presuppositions that the hearer may not know about. This theory explains the data collected in Methodology 2, where the sentences provided with q = ji were accepted as felicitous but the majority were repeated back with q = ji deleted. This suggests that while q = ji use is acceptable, not using q = ji may be more felicitous because there is no overt evidence of these presuppositions on the common ground. This evidence suggests a scale of "overt evidence" that is largely speaker-determined, which would explain why self-reported q = ji-included statements are grammatical (e.g. the context where the speaker is asking for "water again"), but reportative q = ji-included statements do not sound as good (e.g. the context where Gloria says she likes helping Laura).

6 Conclusion

encode an assumption that the hearer knows a certain proposition, in St'át'imcets these presupposition triggers do not project this same assumption of knowledge.

These data give a preliminary overview of the potential presupposition trigger $q \partial j i$ and its patterns in $2ay2aju\theta$ am. From this first analysis, it appears that $q\partial j i$ does share similarities with potential presupposition triggers in St'át'imcets in that these specific words do not assume that the presupposition holds in the common ground. Adopting Gauker (1998)'s theory helps to explain these data, which appear contradictory when compared to English presupposition triggers (cited in Matthewson 2006). Gauker's theory defines presuppositions as representing the speaker's opinion on some specific propositional content rather than assuming that the hearer knows the presuppositional content itself (cited in Matthewson 2006). Thus, the usage of presupposition triggers in $2ay2aju\theta$ am does not entail the same expectations on the addressee as in English. Rather, presupposition triggers in $2ay2aju\theta$ am pattern similarly to those in St'át'imcets.

However, evidence suggests that $q \ni ji$ may not be used productively in discourse-initial contexts, although it is acceptable to do so. Koch's proposal of the "Presupposition Constraint" explains that while it is possible to use words like $q \ni ji$ discourse-initially, speakers avoid using them unless the presuppositional content is supported with overt evidence (Koch 2011).

Further research should expand on existing methodology and delve deeper into presuppositional behaviours. More contexts that the hearer may not know about should be created to better establish when $q \neq ji$ can and cannot be used, whether Koch (2011)'s "Presupposition Constraint" holds across a variety of situations. Using $q \neq ji$ in natural conversation could give better insight as to whether a "Hey, wait a minute" response can be elicited. Further research is needed to compare these findings with other speakers, as these data were collected from one consultant. In addition, interviews with consultants on when to and when to not use $q \neq ji$ could also be conducted to ask speakers what their intuitions regarding this issue are.

In addition, other presupposition behaviours could be examined in light of $q \partial ji$. More tests regarding negation could see whether presuppositional content projects, and if so, whether this affects whether the specific presupposition trigger can be felicitously used discourse-initially. There could also be more examination of truth-conditional content regarding presupposition triggers. Speakers may be able to question the truth conditions of statements without addressing the presupposition itself, since they are not expected to have knowledge of the presupposition in their common ground. Further research with truth conditions would be able to examine whether "Hey, wait a minute" responses are possible in this context or whether they would be unattested.

In conclusion, this paper finds that the presupposition trigger q = ji 'again'/'still' in q = ji 'again'/'still' in q = ji may be used discourse-initially to describe situations occurring for the first time, although more volunteered forms with q = ji were used when describing situations occurring for the second time. These data support Gauker (1998)'s theory of presuppositions and Koch (2011)'s "Presupposition Constraint," although further research is needed to examine multiple contexts to see if a "Hey, wait a minute!" response could be elicited and to test other potential presupposition triggers in q = ji and q = ji and q = ji was a minute!" response could be elicited and to test other potential presupposition triggers in q = ji and q = ji

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Appendix A Details of storyboards and contexts used

Storyboard 1a: There is a picture of a girl, frowning, with some markings coming from her throat. The context is that Laura has a sore throat. The sentence elicited is: I have a sore throat.

Storyboard 1b: There are three pictures. First is a picture of a girl, frowning, with some markings coming from her throat. The second picture is of the same girl, smiling, with no markings. The third picture is similar to the first, where the frowning girl has markings coming from her throat. The context is that Laura had a sore throat, then recovered, but then became sick again. The sentence elicited is: I have a sore throat again.

Storyboard 2a: The picture is of a man, looking tired, and a girl offering the man a cup of coffee. The context is that Henry is tired from spending all night birdwatching, so Laura offers him some coffee. The sentence elicited is: I will give him his coffee.

Storyboard 2b: There are two pictures. The first picture has a man frowning and a girl offering the man a cup of coffee. There is a label in the corner "Monday." The second picture has the same man frowning and the same girl offering the man a cup of coffee, and the label in the corner is "Tuesday." The context is that Henry is tired one night from spending all night birdwatching, so Laura offers him some coffee. The next night, Henry doesn't sleep well, so he is tired the next morning. Laura offers him coffee this morning as well. The sentence elicited is: I will give him his coffee again.

Storyboard 3a: The picture is of one girl helping another girl. The second girl is frowning and has a book on a desk. The context is that Gloria (the first girl) is helping Laura (the second girl) with Laura's homework. The sentence elicited is: Gloria helped me.

Storyboard 3b: There are two pictures. The first picture is of one girl helping another girl. The second girl is frowning and has a book on a desk, and there is a clock in the corner of the picture that reads 3:15. The second picture has the same scenario, except now the clock in the corner reads 3:45. The context is that Gloria (the first girl) is helping Laura (the second girl) with Laura's homework over the course of multiple sessions. The sentence elicited is: Gloria helped me again

Storyboard 4a: The picture shows a happy couple walking along the beach, and a dog is chasing a cat nearby them. The context is that Art and Joanne are walking on the beach and they see the dog chasing the cat. The sentence elicited is: the dog is chasing the cat on the beach.

Storyboard 4b: There are two pictures. The first picture shows a happy couple walking along the beach, and a dog is chasing a cat nearby them. There is a sun in the corner of the picture. The second picture shows the same scenario, except now there is a crescent moon in the corner of the picture. The context is that Art and Joanne walked along the beach in the morning and saw the dog chasing the cat. They went for another walk during nighttime and saw the dog chasing the cat again. The sentence elicited is: the dog is chasing the cat on the beach again.

Storyboard 5a: The picture is of a crying baby named Jack with markings near its stomach and a concerned parent. The context is that the baby is quite hungry. The sentence elicited is: Jack is hungry.

Storyboard 5b: There are three pictures. The first picture is of a baby named Jack crying with markings near its stomach (to show hunger) and a concerned parent. There is a clock in the corner of the picture that reads 3:15. The second picture shows the baby receiving a bottle, its hunger pangs gone, and the parent is smiling. The third picture shows the baby crying again with hunger pangs with the concerned parent, and the clock in the corner shows 3:45. The context is that the baby is very hungry, was fed, and is now hungry again. The sentence elicited is: Jack is hungry.

Storyboard 6a: The picture shows a smiling man in a forest looking at a deer. The context is that the man was hiking and saw a deer. The sentence elicited is: the man saw a deer.

Storyboard 6b: There are two pictures that show a smiling man in a forest looking at a deer with a gleaming sun in the corner. The context is that the man went hiking two days in a row and saw a deer both days. The sentence elicited is: the man saw a deer again.

Storyboard 7a: The picture shows two smiling children picking berries off of bushes. The context is that the children are visiting their aunt's home and are excited to eat the fresh berries growing nearby. The sentence elicited is: the children ate the berries in the garden.

Storyboard 7b: There are two pictures. The first picture shows the children happily eating berries, with a sun in the corner. The second picture shows the children eating berries, except now the sky is slightly overcast. The contexts that the children are visiting their aunt's home and were so excited to eat the berries, they ate them two days in a row. The sentence elicited is: the children ate the berries in the garden again.

Storyboard 8: The picture is of a Bedlington Terrier, an interesting looking dog. The context is that Daniel is walking this dog, and Joanne is surprised to see such an animal and asks what it is. Daniel replies that it is a dog. The sentence elicited in English is: He told me that it is a dog again, and the sentence provided in $\frac{2}{3}$ $\frac{2}{3}$ $\frac{1}{3}$ \frac

Storyboard 9: The picture is of a man tucking a baby in with a blanket. The context is that this is a newborn baby that the parents have just brought home from the hospital. The mother is on the phone with her own mother, who asks what the husband is doing. The sentence elicited in English is: he is tucking in the child again, and the sentence provided in $\frac{\partial u}{\partial t} = \frac{\partial u}{\partial t} = \frac{\partial$

Storyboard 10: The picture is of some knitting needles and knitwork. The context is that my grandmother has offered to teach me how to knit, since I have never learned. The sentence elicited in English is: I will teach you again, and the sentence provided in $\frac{\partial}{\partial t} = \frac{\partial}{\partial t} \frac{\partial}{\partial t} = \frac{\partial}{\partial t} \frac{\partial t} = \frac{\partial}{\partial t} \frac{\partial}{\partial t} = \frac{\partial}{\partial t} \frac{\partial}{\partial t} = \frac{\partial}{\partial t} \frac{\partial}$

Storyboard 11: The picture is of a cute dog. The context is that this is the dog that Daniel has just adopted, and he is going to feed it for the first time. The sentence elicited in English is: I will feed the dog again, and the sentence provided in $\frac{\partial u}{\partial t} = \frac{\partial u}{\partial t} + \frac{\partial u}{\partial t} = \frac{\partial u}{\partial t} +$

Storyboard 12: The picture is of a man buffeted by gusts of wind. The context is that it has become a bit windy outside. The sentence elicited in English is: it is a little windy again, and the sentence provided in $\frac{\partial u}{\partial t} = \frac{\partial u}{\partial t} \frac{\partial u}{\partial t}$ and $\frac{\partial u}{\partial t} = \frac{\partial u}{\partial t} \frac{\partial u}{\partial t}$ and $\frac{\partial u}{\partial t} = \frac{\partial u}{\partial t} \frac{\partial u}{\partial t}$.

Storyboard 13: The picture is of a scowling child. The context is that this is my young cousin who I have met for the first time. Instead of greeting me, the child runs up and kicks me right away. The sentence elicited in English is: the child kicked me again, and the sentence provided in $\frac{\partial u}{\partial t} = \frac{\partial u}{\partial t}$.

Storyboard 14: The picture is of a man talking to a waiter. The context is that the man is at a café, and he ordered coffee and sat down. Now he is asking the waiter to give him some water. The sentence elicited in English is: give me water again, and the sentence provided in $\frac{\partial u}{\partial t} = \frac{\partial u}{\partial t} + \frac{\partial u}{\partial t} = \frac{\partial u}{\partial t} + \frac$

Storyboard 15: The picture is of a baby grizzly bear. The context is that the bear was so cute, so I had to buy it as a pet. The sentence elicited in English is I bought a baby grizzly bear again, and the sentence provided in $\frac{2}{3}$ and $\frac{2}{3}$ a

Storyboard 16: The picture is of a dish of grilled octopus tentacles. The context is that Marianne and I went to dinner last night, and she tried octopus for the first time. The sentence elicited in English is Marianne eats octopus again, and the sentence provided in $\frac{\partial u}{\partial t} = \frac{\partial u}{\partial t$

Storyboard 17: The picture is of a pure white house. The context is that Roger has bought a new house, but doesn't like the colour of it very much. He decides to paint the door black. The sentence elicited in English is: paint the door black again, and the sentence provided in $\frac{\partial u}{\partial x} = \frac{\partial u}{\partial x} =$