

## Comparative Notes on the Determiner *re* in Secwepemctsin\*

Michel Navarro  
University of British Columbia

Sander Nederveen  
University of British Columbia

**Abstract:** This paper compares some semantic properties of the determiner *re* in Secwepemctsin (Shuswap Salish) with the corresponding determiners in St'át'imcets (Lillooet Salish). Employing original Secwepemctsin data, we first show that the so-called 'proximal/visual/present determiner' *re* can give rise to temporally free interpretations and individual concept readings of DPs, unlike its counterpart(s) in St'át'imcets (Demirdache 1996). Secondly, we demonstrate that DPs headed by *re* allow narrow scope readings with respect to operators such as negation, *if*-clauses, intensional verbs, modals, and quantificational phrases. This is contrary to St'át'imcets, in which a subset of indefinites takes obligatorily wide scope with respect to these operators (Matthewson 1996, 1998, 1999), whereas in Secwepemctsin *re* has optional scope. Based on these facts, we claim that *re* is an unmarked determiner, since it encodes neither deictic features nor assertion-of-existence. This is also contrary to its counterparts in St'át'imcets, which carry both properties, as shown by Matthewson. This is the first systematic semantic investigation of the determiner *re* in Secwepemctsin, with which we intend to contribute to our knowledge of semantic variations across determiner systems in Salish.

**Keywords:** Secwepemctsin, Salishan, determiners, assertion-of-existence, scope

### 1 Introduction

This paper demonstrates that the determiner *re* in Secwepemctsin exhibits a set of semantic properties that differ from its counterparts in St'át'imcets. It also presents data that have important consequences for our understanding of variation across determiner systems in Salish. Secwepemctsin and St'át'imcets are Interior Salish languages. Secwepemctsin is spoken in Central and Southern British Columbia and has fewer than 100 fluent speakers (Dunlop et al. 2018). St'át'imcets is spoken in Southern British Columbia and has fewer than 100 fluent speakers (Dunlop et al. 2018). We present original Secwepemctsin data showing that the 'proximal/visual/present' determiner *re* can be used in contexts that give rise to temporally free interpretations and individual concept readings of DPs, unlike the corresponding determiners in St'át'imcets (Demirdache 1996). Moreover, we demonstrate that DPs headed by *re* allow narrow scope readings with respect to operators such as negation, *if*-clauses, intensional verbs, modals, and quantificational phrases, contrary to wide scope indefinite DPs in St'át'imcets. In other words, whereas in St'át'imcets a subset of indefinites can only take wide scope with respect to these operators, in Secwepemctsin, the scope of *re* is variable. The findings laid out here have important

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We use the following abbreviations: 1/2/3 = 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> person; CTR = control; D = determiner; ERG = ergative; EXIS = existential; FUT = future; NCM = limited-control middle; NCT = limited-control transitive; NEG = negation; NMLZ = nominalizer; PL = plural; POSS = possessive; PRF = perfect; PROG = progressive; PST = past; RLT = relational; RM= remote; SBJV = subjunctive; SG = singular; STAT = stativizer.; SUBJ = subject; TR = transitive.

consequences for variation across determiner systems in Salish. Matthewson (1996, 1998, 1999), who provides the first formal analysis of determiners in Salish, hypothesizes that determiner systems across Salish languages encode assertion-of-existence, rather than definiteness or specificity. She argues that assertion-of-existence determiners disallow individual concept interpretations, temporally free readings, and obligatorily take wide scope with respect to negation and intensional operators. However, our findings, along with Lyon (2011) on Nsyilxcən — a Southern Interior Salish language with just one determiner — show that one cannot classify all determiners in Salish as encoding either assertion or non-assertion of existence.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, the converging results presented here and in Lyon (2011) are part of a growing body of research on variations across and within determiner systems in Salish.<sup>2</sup>

The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide some basic facts about the distribution of determiners in Secwepemctsin and St’át’imcets. In Section 3, we offer a brief description of our fieldwork methodology. In Section 4, we show that DPs with *re* in Secwepemctsin allow temporally free interpretations (TFI) and individual concept readings (ICR). We contrast these findings with Demirdache (1996), who shows that these readings are disallowed by the subset of determiners that encode the present/absent distinction in St’át’imcets. In Section 5, we display data on the narrow scope interpretation of *re* with respect to negation, intensional verbs, modals, *if*-clauses, and quantificational DPs. We again contrast these findings with St’át’imcets, which has obligatorily wide-scope interpretations of (a subset of) indefinite determiners. In Section 6, we propose an analysis of *re* as an unmarked determiner. Based on our findings, we claim that it encodes neither deictic features nor assertion-of-existence. In addition, we also touch on issues raised by our findings, particularly in connection with broader questions about variation across determiner systems in Salish. In Section 7, the conclusion, we suggest directions for future research that will enrich our understanding of the determiner system in Secwepemctsin.

## 2 The distribution of determiners in Secwepemctsin and St’át’imcets

### 2.1 Secwepemctsin

The Secwepemctsin determiners are schematized in Table 1, adapted from Kuipers (1974) and Gardiner (1993).

**Table 1:** Secwepemctsin determiner inventory (Kuipers 1974)

	<b>Present/Proximal</b>	<b>Absent/Distal</b>	<b>Hypothetical/Irrrealis</b>
<b>Direct case</b>	<i>re</i>	<i>le</i>	<i>k</i>
<b>Oblique case</b>	<i>te</i>	<i>te</i>	<i>tek</i>

Table 1 indicates that Secwepemctsin determiners encode case distinctions. The direct case determiners head subjects and objects of transitive verbs and subjects of intransitives. In contrast, oblique case determiners head oblique arguments, patients of middle constructions, and adjuncts. The determiner system also encodes spatial-temporal deictic features.

<sup>1</sup> We do not discuss the data in Nsyilxcən: for details see Lyon (2011).

<sup>2</sup> For an analysis of determiners in Skwxw7úmesh, see Gillon (2006). For a recent work on ʔayʔajuθəm, see Huijismans et al. (2020).

Secwepemctsin determiners always precede their complements and are obligatory on nouns in argument positions, as illustrated in (1a–b) and (2a–b).

- (1) a. xexé7 [re kúkwi7]  
powerful D chief  
'The chief is strong.'
- b. \* xexé7 [kúkwi7]  
powerful chief
- (2) a. [re xu7t] m-taxel-men-s [re cteqméwll]  
D sturgeon PRF-attack- RLT-[TR]-3ERG D boat  
'A sturgeon attacked a boat.'
- b. \* [xu7t] m-taxel-men-s [cteqméwll]<sup>3</sup>  
sturgeon PRF-attack-TR-3ERG boat

Determiners are number-neutral in Secwepemctsin, as shown in the minimal pair in (3a–b), where the same determiner co-occurs with singular and plural nouns.

- (3) a. xexé7 [re kúkwi7]  
strong D chief.SG  
'The chief is strong.'
- b. xexé7 [re kukúkwi7]<sup>4</sup>  
strong D chief.PL  
'The chiefs are strong.'

As for the hypothetical/irrealis determiners, they seem to be licensed by non-factual operators that c-command them, such as negation and intensional operators. Consider the instances below (based on Kuipers 1974).

- (4) ta7 k s-kwen-[n]wélln-s re Sander [tek swewll]  
NEG D NMLZ-take-NCM-3POSS D Sander D+OBL fish  
'Sander did not catch a fish.'
- (5) Sander héqen me7 meríye-n-s [k lleqemélten]  
Sander may/might FUT marry-CTR-[TR]-3ERG D teacher  
'Sander may/might marry a professor.'
- (6) \*qwetséts [k kúkwi7]  
leave D chief  
'A chief left.'

<sup>3</sup> In (2b), the sentence-initial determiner might have been elided, and its absence need not yield ungrammaticality. The absence of a determiner on the object NP unambiguously yields ungrammaticality.

<sup>4</sup> Plurals are formed via reduplication of the root in Secwepemctsin.

The information provided above on the determiner system in Secwepemctsin is by no means exhaustive but suffices for the purposes of this paper. This paper concentrates on the present/proximal determiner *re*. We present new data that support the hypothesis that, among other things, *re* does not encode the deictic features that the descriptive literature claims it does (Kuipers 1974; Gardiner 1993).

## 2.2 St'át'imcets

The inventory of determiners in St'át'imcets is schematized in Table 2, adapted from Matthewson (1996, 1998, 1999).

**Table 2:** St'át'imcets determiner inventory (Matthewson 1996, 1998, 1999)

	<b>Present</b>	<b>Absent</b>	<b>Remote</b>	<b>Hypothetical/Irrealis</b>
<b>Singular</b>	ti-...=a	ni-...=a	ku-...=a	ku
<b>Plural</b>	i-...a	nelh-...=a	kwelh-...=a	ku

St'át'imcets determiners are also obligatory on nouns. Most determiners come in two parts: one part precedes the noun as a proclitic, and the other part is attached to the noun as an enclitic. This is illustrated in (7).

- (7) wa7 ts'aqw-an'ítas [i=t'éc=a] [i=míxalh=a]  
 IPFV eat-TR-3PL.ERG D.PL=sweet=EXIS D.PL=bear=EXIS  
 'Bears eat honey.' (Matthewson 1996:76)

Determiners in St'át'imcets encode number, except for the hypothetical *ku*. This is exemplified by the minimal pair in (8a–b).

- (8) a. á7xa7 [ti=kel7áqsten=a]  
 powerful D.SG=leader=EXIS  
 'The chief is powerful.'
- b. á7xa7 [i=kel7áqsten=a]  
 powerful D.PL=leader=EXIS  
 'The chiefs are powerful.' (Adapted from Demirdache 1996)

Matthewson (1996, 1998, 1999) shows that the hypothetical/irrealis determiner *ku* is licensed by non-factual operators c-commanding it, as illustrated in the examples below.

- (9) cw7aodz kw=s=7áts'x-en-as [ku=sqáycw]  
 NEG D=NMLZ=see-TR-3ERG D=man  
 'S/he didn't see any men.' (Matthewson 1999:88)

(10) az'-en=lhkán=**kelh** [ku=káoh]  
 buy-TR=1SG.SUBJ=might [D=car]  
 'I'm going to by a car.' (Matthewson 1996:203)

(11) \*áts'x-en-as [ku=sqáycw]  
 see-TR-3ERG [D=man]  
 'S/he saw a man.' (Matthewson 1999:88)

The facts offered above about the distribution of determiners in St'át'imcets suffice for the comparison pursued in this paper. For an exhaustive discussion of St'át'imcets determiners, see Matthewson (1996, 1998, 1999).

### 3 Fieldwork methodology

The Secwepemcetsín data presented in this paper result from fieldwork carried out over a one-year period. The data were obtained through direct elicitation with two different first-language speakers of the western dialect of Secwepemcetsín. The elicitation sessions were conducted through Zoom. Our data points are accompanied by speaker codes C1 and/or C2 to differentiate between consultants who provided the data and judgments. Code C1/2 indicates that a data point has been agreed upon by both consultants.

During these sessions, consultants were asked questions designed to prompt answers that rely on their linguistic knowledge. The data were elicited through grammaticality judgments, translation tasks, pairing sentences with discourse contexts, in the form of verbal descriptions, and through language-independent single images and storyboards (Bochnak & Matthewson 2020; Bohnemeyer 2015; Deal 2015; Krifka 2011; Matthewson 2004, 2012). The scenarios set up a discourse context, and the consultants were then asked whether a sentence was felicitous given the context. We also elicited truth-value judgments, asking consultants whether the sentence in the target language accurately represents the facts described in the context. That is, given the information provided by the context, whether the sentence in the target language is true. The verbal descriptions are original, as well as some of the images/storyboards we used. Storyboard scenarios that we did not create ourselves were selected from the Scope Fieldwork Project (Bruening 2008).

## 4 Temporally free interpretation and individual concept reading.


### 4.1 Temporally free interpretation

Demirdache (1996) shows that DPs in St'át'imcets “do not have the range of temporal interpretations” displayed by definite DPs in English (Demirdache 1996:17). For example, the English sentence (12a) can have a reading in which the temporal interpretation of the DP *the president of the United States* is independent of the temporal interpretation of the main predicate. That is, (12a) can be true if the current president of the United States was powerful at a time prior to becoming the president, as illustrated in the timeline (12b).<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> The timeline representation is adapted from Demirdache (1996). ‘UTT’ stands for the utterance time.

(12) a. The president of the United States was powerful.





This phenomenon is known as a temporally free interpretation (TFI). TFI readings are also available when the evaluation time of the main predicate is interpreted in the future. Sentence (13) can be interpreted as saying that the current president of the United States will be politically weak at a time in the future when he is not the president anymore.

(13) The president of the United States will be weak.

According to Demirdache (1996) and Matthewson (1996, 1998), the temporal interpretation of the subject DP in St’át’imcets always overlaps with the temporal interpretation of the main predicate. This means that TFIs of subject DPs are not available in St’át’imcets. Sentence (14a), with the remote temporal deictic marker *tu7*, allows only two readings. If the DP is employed to refer to the current president, the temporal interpretation of the NP must stretch into the past so as to overlap with the past time evaluation of the VP. That is, it will mean that the current president was already the president when he was powerful, which is illustrated in (14b). A second available reading is one in which (14a) is true if the individual who was the president at a past time was powerful at that time interval, as shown in (14c). In this interpretation the individual is not a president anymore at the utterance time.

(14) a. á7xa7 tu7 [ti=kel7áqsten-s=a ti=US=a]  
 powerful RM D=chief-3POSS=EXIS D=US=EXIS  
 ‘The president of the US was powerful.’ (Demirdache 1996:7)



Demirdache (1996) attributes the availability of readings (14b–c) and the lack of (13b) in St’át’imcets to the fact that determiners in St’át’imcets encode deictic properties. To account for

this, she adopts Carlson’s (1977) ontology, according to which the domain of individuals contains stages, in addition to objects and kinds. Stages are conceived as spatio-temporal instantiations of individuals. Since a subset of determiners in St’át’imcets encode deictic distinctions, Demirdache (1996:2) concludes that they “supply entities with spatio-temporal boundaries” and that by referring to “spatio-temporally bounded slices of individuals”, these DPs force main predicates to apply to the stages they single out.

Secwepemctsin differs from St’át’imcets by allowing TFIs. Sentence (15b), which contains a subject DP headed by the determiner *re*, is true in the context (15a). In it, the time interval during which the individual *x* is the chief of Kamloops does not overlap with the past time at which *x* had the property of being weak.

(15) a. *Context: The new chief of Kamloops, before he took this important position, used to be a frail, weak guy. However, now that he is the chief, he turns out to be a strong and powerful leader. You find this a remarkable development and while thinking about how he used to be so weak, you say to yourself:*

b. **m**-tsqwnuxw [re kúkwpí7-s re Tk’emlúps] C2  
 PRF-weak D chief-3POSS D Kamloops  
 ‘The chief of Kamloops was weak.’

*Consultant’s comment:* “Yeah, that’s a sentence! One time he was weak and pitiful but when his people stood him up as chief he was strong and powerful.”

Note that (15b) has the anteriority marker *m*- attached to the predicate *tsqwnuxw* ‘weak’, which shifts the evaluation time of the predicate to a time in the past, but it does not affect the temporal interpretation of the DP. The temporal interpretation of the DP overlaps with the utterance time. The same interpretation was attested when the sentence contains the anteriority marker *lu7* in postverbal position, as illustrated in (16).


(16) tsqwnuxw **lu7** [re kúkwpí7-s re Tk’mlups] C2  
 weak PST D chief-3SG.POSS D Kamloops  
 ‘The chief of Kamloops was weak.’

*Consultant’s comment:* “Okay. He was frail and weak. *Lu7* also means it’s past tense. But since then he’s recovered.”

TFI is also attested in future tense sentences. Sentence (17b) is true in the context (17a).

(17) a. *Context: The current mayor of Vancouver, because of his position, is a strong and powerful leader. In a month from now there will be a new election for mayor and he will not run for it. In fact, he decided to never run for it again. Thinking that the day after he passes over his position, he will become an ordinary frail, weak guy, you say to yourself:*

b. **me7** tsqwnuxw [re kúkwpí7-s re penkúpa]  
 FUT weak D chief-3.POSS D Vancouver  
 ‘The mayor of Vancouver will be weak.’



Given context (17a), sentence (17b) means that the current mayor of Vancouver will become weak at some point in the future when he is not a mayor anymore, as illustrated in the timeline (17c). Based on the acceptance of sentences (15a), (16), and (17b) in the contexts provided above, we can conclude that TFLs of DPs are available in Secwepemctsin. That is, the time intervals of DPs in Secwepemctsin need not overlap with the time intervals of the predicate.

#### 4.2 Individual concept reading

Demirdache (1996) also demonstrates that DPs headed by deictic determiners in St'át'imcets lack individual concept readings (ICR). That is, DPs cannot be interpreted as denoting any past, present, or future individual to which the descriptive contents of the NPs apply. English sentence (18a) is illustrative for an ICR. The definite DP in (18a) can have an ICR, i.e., *the president of the United States* is interpreted as describing whoever was, is, or will be the president. One way of capturing these readings is by universally quantifying over a time interval variable, as illustrated in (18b).<sup>6</sup>

- (18) a. The president of the United States is (always) powerful.  
 b.  $\forall t$ , whoever is president of the US at  $t$  is powerful at  $t$ .

Contrastingly, the counterpart DP in St'át'imcets, which is headed by the deictic determiner  $i=\dots=a$ , can only be used in (19) to refer to a particular individual or whoever is the current president.<sup>7</sup>

- (19) a. á7xa7 [ti=kel7áqsten-s-a ti=United-States-a]  
 powerful D=leader-3POSS=EXIS D=United.States=EXIS  
 'The president of the United States is powerful.' (Demirdache 1996:5)  
 b.  $\forall t$ , whoever is president of the US at  $t$  is powerful at  $t$ .

Moreover, quantificational phrases in St'át'imcets lack ICRs, as illustrated in (20).

- (20) a. á7xa7 [tákem i=kel7áqsten=a]  
 powerful all D.PL=leader=EXIS  
 'All the chiefs are powerful.' (Demirdache 1996:9)  
 b.  $\checkmark \forall x$ , if  $x$  is chief now, then  $x$  is powerful now.  
 c. \*  $\forall x \forall t$ , if  $x$  is chief at  $t$ , then  $x$  is powerful at  $t$ .

<sup>6</sup> Depending on the theory/ontology you adopt, it can also be represented as quantifying over occasions, situations, etc.

<sup>7</sup> In the absence of any aspectual or tense marker, root sentences with stative verbs are interpreted in the present (Demirdache 1996). The same seems to hold for Secwepemctsin.



The unavailability of reading (20c) is expected, given the distribution of quantifiers in St’át’imcets. In (20a), the quantifier word *tákem* ‘all’ takes as complement a DP headed by the deictic plural determiner  $i = \dots = a$ . Consequently, its domain of quantification is a sum of individuals who are chiefs at the utterance time.<sup>8</sup>

Once again Secwepemctsin departs from St’át’imcets. DPs headed by *re* allow ICRs, as attested by (21a–c).

- (21) a. *Context: You’re watching a documentary with your wife about impactful decisions by presidents of the United States. You see how Lincoln abolished slavery, how Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act, but also how Trump pulled out the Paris Climate Accord. It ends foreshadowing how the next president will have to take a decision on climate change that impacts the whole world. Impressed by the documentary, you say to her:*<sup>9</sup>
- b. (tekemtús) xexé7 [re kúkwpí7-s re United-States] C1/2  
 always powerful D chief-3SG.POSS D United.States  
 ‘The president of the United States is (always) powerful.’
- c.  $\forall t$ , whoever is president of the US at  $t$  is powerful at  $t$ .

Context (21a) covers past, present, and future presidents. The fact that (21b) is accepted in this context shows that ICRs are available in Secwepemctsin. Based on this, we predict that ICRs are also available in quantificational phrases. This prediction is borne out, as shown in (22a–b).

- (22) a. *Context: An elder tells you about the great deeds of the past (not alive anymore) and current chiefs. The elder finishes the conversation by saying that the future chiefs will also be leaders of great deeds. Agreeing with the elder, you say:*
- b. (tekemtús) xexé7-s [xwexwéyt re kúkwpí7] C1  
 always strong-3POSS all D chief.PL  
 ‘All the chiefs are (always) powerful.’
- Consultant’s comment:* “That’s [22b] our agreement with the elder.”
- c.  $\forall x \forall t [x \text{ is chief at } t \rightarrow [x \text{ is powerful at } t]]$

Matthewson (1996, 1998) argues that the lack of ICRs in St’át’imcets constitutes further evidence against any eventual homophony/ambiguity analysis of determiners in Salish. Under a homophony/ambiguity analysis, Salish determiners would be ambiguous between definites and

<sup>8</sup> For a semantic/syntactic analysis of quantificational phrases in St’át’imcets, see Matthewson (1996, 1998, 2001). In her analysis, the restrictor of *tákem* is a plural individual selected by the choice function introduced by  $i = \dots = a$ . The quantifier, hence, quantifies over the parts of a plural individual. This entails that the restrictor of *tákem* is of type  $e$ , and not  $et$ , as standardly assumed by the generalized quantifier theory. In other words, Matthewson proposes that quantifiers can denote a relation between an individual and a set. For a different approach, which analyses *tákem* as a maximizing operator, along the lines proposed by Brisson (2003) for *all*, see Davis (2010, 2013).

<sup>9</sup> This elicitation was carried out before the 2020 US presidential election.

indefinites, since they don't encode the familiar/novel distinction. However, such an approach cannot exclusively rely on this broadly documented fact about determiner systems in Salish. While it is a necessary condition for the ambiguity analysis that the Novelty/Familiarity Condition (Heim 1982) does not apply in Salish, it is not sufficient. To advocate for the ambiguity analysis, it is necessary to show that determiners in Salish share other properties common to definite descriptions. Matthewson exhaustively demonstrates that this is not the case in St'át'imcets. Among the pieces of evidence is the fact that DPs in St'át'imcets lack ICRs. On the assumption that ICR is a property common to definite/quantificational DPs, "we would expect the Individual Concept Reading [...] to be possible" (Matthewson 1996:39).

Another essential property associated with definites that determiners in St'át'imcets lack is presupposition of existence. Matthewson (1996) points out that if they presupposed existence, then it should be possible to cancel it. A typical case of presupposition cancelling involves the explicit denial of a presupposed (existential) proposition.<sup>10</sup> However, example (23) shows that this is not possible in St'át'imcets.<sup>11</sup>

- (23) A: qan'ím=lhkan kw=s=emh-ál'qwem' [ti=kukwpi7-láp=a]  
 Hear=1SG.SUBJ D=NMLZ =good-appear D=chief-2PL.POSS=EXIS  
 'I heard you guys have a good-looking chief.'
- B: wá7=lhkahl ícwa7 es-kúkwpi7  
 IPFV=1PL.SBJ without have-chief  
 'We don't have a chief.'
- \* Nilh s=cw7aoz kwa emh-ál'qwem' [ti=kukwpi7=a]  
 FOC NMLZ=NEG D+IPFV good-appear D=chief=EXIS  
 'So there isn't a good-looking chief.' (Matthewson 1996:120–121)

Presupposition cancelling in (23) would work as follows. On the assumption that the DP *ti=kukwpi7=a* presupposes the existence of a chief, once this presupposition is denied in B's first sentence, the presupposition of B's second sentence is neutralized. As a result, the sentence is accepted. But this does not hold in (23) and B's second sentence is rejected. This is so because assertion-of-existence cannot be cancelled. Denying and asserting the existence of a chief in the same discourse yield a contradiction. An assertion-of-existence in a negative existential construction like B's second sentence is even ungrammatical in St'át'imcets. So much so that "the determiner in B's second sentence was corrected by the consultant to a non-assertion of existence

<sup>10</sup> For discussions and analyses of presupposition cancelling, see Karttunen (1974), Stalnaker (1974), Gazdar (1979), Soames (1989), Heim (1990, 1991), Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (2000), Abbott (2006), Abrusán (2016). For analyses of presupposition cancellation under negation as a case of accommodation, see Heim (1982, 1990), and Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (2000).

<sup>11</sup> Note that the corresponding English version of (13) is accepted by English speakers:

- (i) A: I heard you guys have a good-looking chief.  
 B: We don't HAVE a chief, so the chief can't be good-looking! (Matthewson 1996:120)

determiner” (Matthewson 1996:121). That is, B’s second sentence is a case of both contradiction and ungrammaticality.<sup>12</sup>

Nonetheless, a DP with *re* was accepted in a similar type of presupposition cancelling environment, as illustrated below.

(24) A: qeqním-en re s-yegwyúgt-s [re-7 kúkwi7] C1  
 hear-1ERG D NMLZ-powerful-3POSS D-2SG.POSS chief  
 ‘I heard that your chief is powerful.’

B: Ta7 pell-kúkwi7-s kucw  
 NEG [NMLZ-]have-chief-3POSS 1PL.EXCL  
 ‘We don’t have a chief.’

Yeri7 ul ta7 k s-yegwyúgtw-s [re kúkwi7]<sup>13</sup> C1  
 then ? NEG D NMLZ-strong-3POSS D chief  
 ‘So the chief isn’t powerful.’

*We:* “Does it make sense, as a whole?”

*Consultant’s reply:* “Yes, it does!”

B’s second sentence in (24) is accepted, despite the denial of the existence of a chief in the preceding sentence. The felicitousness of dialogue (24) indicates that the DP *re kúkwi7* does not assert existence.

The lack of TFIs, ICRs, and presuppositions in a subset of determiners in St’át’imcets partially informs Matthewson’s (1996, 1999) hypothesis that deictic determiners in Salish encode assertion-of-existence.<sup>14</sup> The assertion-of-existence analysis accounts for the infelicity of dialogues like (23) in St’át’imcets, because assertion-of-existence is not cancellable in cases like (23). Assertion-of-existence also predicts the lack of ICRs in St’át’imcets, as assertion-of-existence/deictic DPs always locate their referents “in the discourse situation, and this prevents [...] variation across situations” (Matthewson 2008:543).<sup>15</sup>

To sum up, in this section we have shown that in Secwepemctsin DPs headed by the determiner *re* do not behave like their counterpart DPs in St’át’imcets with respect to TFIs and ICRs. While St’át’imcets DPs with *ti*=...=*a* and *i*=...=*a* do not allow TFIs and ICRs (i.e., are temporally bound), Secwepemctsin DPs headed by *re* allow for these constructions. Moreover, a DP with *re* was

<sup>12</sup> We thank Henry Davis (p.c) for pointing out to us that B’s second sentence in (23) is a negative existential construction, and that assertion-of-existence Ds are always ungrammatical in these constructions. Although Matthewson (1996) translates B’s second sentence as ‘so the chief can’t be good-looking’, we opted for the more precise translation suggested by Henry Davis. However, based on Matthewson (1996, 1998, 1999), it is expected that a sentence in St’át’imcets of the type ‘so the chief can’t be good-looking’ containing an assertion-existence D would be infelicitous in the discourse (23), due to the contradiction that it would engender. To avoid this issue in Secwepemctsin, we opted for a sentence that is not a negative existential construction.

<sup>13</sup> We don’t know the syntactic and semantic roles of the item *ul* in (24).

<sup>14</sup> Other semantic facts about St’át’imcets are essential for the assertion-of-existence hypothesis. See sections 5 and 6.

<sup>15</sup> However, assertion-of-existence and deictic features alone do not seem to entail the absence of TFIs observed in St’át’imcets. We are inclined to think that Demirdache’s claim that the entities picked out by St’át’imcets deictic DPs are stages provides the missing premise to derive the lack of TFIs.

accepted in a dialogue that gives rise to presupposition cancelling, which is unexpected if *re* encodes assertion-of-existence.

## 5 Narrow scope readings of *re*

In this section, we turn to scope interactions of DPs containing *re* with respect to negation, modals, intensional verbs, *if*-clauses, and universally quantified phrases. We again adopt a comparative stance, highlighting the contrasts between Secwepemctsin and St’át’imcets.

### 5.1 Negation

Matthewson (1999) shows that deictic determiners in St’át’imcets obligatorily take wide scope with respect to the sentential negation *cw7oaz* ‘not’, as illustrated below.

- (25) a. *cw7oaz kw=s=7áz’-en-as [ti=sts’úqwaz’=a] kw=s-Sophie*  
 NEG D=NMLZ=buy-TR-3ERG [D=fish=-EXIS] D=NMLZ-Sophie  
 ‘Sophie didn’t buy a fish.’ (= ‘There is a fish which Sophie didn’t buy.’)  
 (Matthewson 1999:91)

- b.  $\checkmark \exists x [\text{fish}(x) \wedge \neg [\text{buy}(x) (\text{Sophie})]] \quad \exists > \neg$   
 c. \*  $\neg [\exists x [\text{fish}(x) \wedge \neg [\text{buy}(x) (\text{Sophie})]]] \quad \neg > \exists$

The only available reading of the DP in (25a) is paraphrased in the predicate logic formula in (25b), i.e., the existential quantifier scopes over negation. The reading in (25c) is ruled out.<sup>16</sup> Hence, (25a) will always be true in contexts where there is at least one fish that wasn’t bought.

In contrast, a narrow scope reading of the determiner *re* in Secwepemctsin under negation is available. The availability of this reading was revealed through the storyboard scenario in Figure 1, in which there is no fish present in any of the pictures.<sup>17</sup>



1. Peter goes fishing



2. He doesn't catch anything, so he tries the other side

<sup>16</sup> Matthewson (1999) shows that narrow scope readings of DPs are only available in St’át’imcets with DPs headed by the irrealis determiner *ku*. That is to say, for every wide scope example displayed in this section, there is a narrow scope version accomplished by replacing the deictic determiner by *ku*.

<sup>17</sup> Example (26a) is an adapted version of a storyboard available in the webpage of The Scope Fieldwork Project. We erased all the fish in the river, to eliminate a wide-scope interpretation of the determiner.



3. He still hasn't caught anything so he sits down



4. Finally, he leaves

**Figure 1:** Storyboard “Peter goes fishing”

- (26) a. ta7 k s-kwen-wélln-s re Peter [re swewll] C1/2  
 NEG D NMLZ-take-NCM-3POSS D Peter D fish  
 ‘Peter did not catch a fish.’

*Consultant’s comment (GD):* “This says Peter didn’t catch any fish.”

*Consultant’s comment (RI):* “My tongue was going to *tek swewll* [oblique irrealis], but you can also say it this way.”

- b.  $\checkmark \neg [\exists x [\text{fish}(x) \wedge [\text{buy}(x) (\text{Peter})]]] \neg > \exists$

The fact that (26a) can be used to describe Figure 1 unequivocally shows that the narrow scope of *re* in relation to negation is possible, as paraphrased in (26b). This conclusion is further strengthened by the scenario in which the consultants accepted (26a) when it is followed by a subsequent statement that explicitly denies the existence of any fish at all in the river.<sup>18</sup>

- (27) a. ta7 k s-kwen-wélln-s re Peter [re swewll] C1/2  
 NEG D NMLZ-take-NCM-3SG D Peter D fish  
 ‘Peter did not catch a fish.’

- b. ta7 k s-ten-s [tek stem n setétkwe]<sup>19</sup> C1/2  
 NEG D NMLZ-exist-3POSS D+OBL what PREP river  
 ‘There is nothing in the river.’

<sup>18</sup> We thank Lisa Matthewson for proposing this test.

<sup>19</sup> Note that the NP *stem* ‘what, anything’ is the complement of an irrealis determiner.

## 5.2 Intensional operators

The Secwepemctsin determiner *re* can also take narrow scope under modals. We tested this in a number of scenarios. Matthewson (1996) found that St’át’imcets DPs headed by determiner *ti=...=a* always take scope over the modal *kelh* ‘might’. Secwepemctsin DPs headed by *re* allow narrow scope under the corresponding modal *héqen* ‘might/may’. Example (28a) exemplifies the behavior of *ti=...=a* in St’át’imcets. Matthewson (1991:91) says about (28a) that it “commits the speaker to the claim that a priest exists”.

- (28) a. kán=as=kelh      qwal’út-s-as      k=Mary      [ti=naplít=a]  
 WH-3CONJ=might    talk-CAUS-3ERG    D =Mary    D =priest=EXIS  
 ‘Mary might talk to a priest.’ (= ‘There is a priest who Mary might talk to.’)  
 (Matthewson 1999:90)

- b.  $\exists x [x \text{ is a priest} \wedge [\text{Mary might talk to } x]]$

As for Secwepemctsin, the narrow scope reading is again an alternative. In addition to a wide scope reading induced by context (29a), sentence (29c) is also true in context (29b). Note that interpreted in the context (29b), sentence (29c) does not commit the speaker to the existence of any (particular) professor.

- (29) a. *Context: Sander tells you that he would like to marry Johanna, who is a professor. He doesn’t know if Johanna will accept his proposal, so he is still unsure. You tell your friend:*
- b. *Context: Sander tells you that he is looking to find a partner and that, whoever they may be, he would like them to be a professor. You comment to your sister:*
- c. Sander héqen      me7    meriye-n-s      [re lleqémélten]      C1  
 Sander may/might FUT marry-CTR[-TR]-3ERG    D teacher  
 ‘Sander might marry a professor.’
- d. ✓ héqen > re lleqémélten  
 e. ✓ re lleqémélten > héqen

(29a–c) provide evidence that Secwepemctsin DPs headed by *re* can take wide and narrow scope with respect to an intensional operator like *héqen* ‘maybe’.

Additionally, we found that DPs headed by *re* can also get narrow scope in *if*-clauses. This also contrasts with St’át’imcets *ti=...=a*. The St’át’imcets sentence (30a) can only be true in a scenario that enforces the wide scope with respect to *ti=...=a*, i.e., with the DP being interpreted outside the *if*-clause. That is, (30a) is rejected in context (30b) and accepted in context (30c).

- (30) a. cuz’      tsa7cw    kw=s-Mary    lh-t’íq=as      [ti=qelhmémen’=a]  
 going.to happy    D=NMLZ-Mary HYP-arrive=3SBV    D =old.person(DIM)=EXIS  
 ‘Mary will be happy if an elder comes.’

- b. *Context: There are a bunch of elders in this community. Mary dislikes most of these elders and doesn't want them to come. There is just one elder who she wants to come.*
- c. *Context: Mary will be happy if any elders come, but that's impossible, because there are no elders in this community.*

(Matthewson 1999:90)

The obligatory wide scope reading of (30a) can be paraphrased as (31).

(31)  $\exists x$  [elder ( $x$ )  $\wedge$  [come( $x$ )  $\rightarrow$  happy (Mary)]]

As for Secwepemctsin, both readings are available: *re* can have narrow and wide scope with respect to *if*-clauses. Sentence (32c) is true in both contexts (32a) and (32b).

- (32) a. *Context: Sander likes intelligent people. Although he doesn't have a particular professor in mind (he even has never met one), he believes that if he marries a professor, no matter who they turn out to be, he will be happy.*
- b. *Context: It's Sander's dream to marry Johanna, who is a professor. He would be so happy if she marries him. You tell your friend about this:*
- c. Sander me7 tse7écw e meriye-n-es [re lleqémelten]. C1  
 Sander FUT happy IF marry-CTR[-TR]-3ERG D teacher  
 'Sander will be happy if he marries a professor.'
- d.  $\checkmark$   $[\exists x$  [professor ( $x$ )  $\wedge$  marry ( $x$ )]  $\rightarrow$  happy (Sander)]
- e.  $\checkmark$   $\exists x$  [professor ( $x$ )  $\wedge$  [marry( $x$ )  $\rightarrow$  happy (Sander)]]

The paraphrase (32d), by including the existential and its restrictor as part of the antecedent, captures the narrow scope interpretation of (32d), namely that Sander will be happy if he marries any professor, no matter who they are. The paraphrase (32e), in turn, captures the wide scope interpretation, since the existential and its restrictor are not part of the antecedent and scope over the *if*-clause.

Furthermore, we also see that *re* can be interpreted under the scope of the intensional verb *qwen* 'want'. Sentence (33b) is true in context (33a).

- (33) a. *Context: Sander tells you that although he is still not interested in any professor in particular, no matter who will eventually be his partner, they have to be a professor. You tell your neighbour about this and say:*
- b. Sander qwen-mín-s e s-meriye-n-s [re lleqémelten] C1  
 Sander want-RLT-[TR-]3ERG if NMLZ-marry-TR-3SG D teacher  
 'Sander wants to marry a professor.'

- c. ✓ qwen > re lleqemélten

The scenario in (33a) enforces the narrow scope interpretation of the DP. Sander doesn't have any preference for a partner, so long as they are in the extension of the predicate *lleqemélten* 'teacher/professor'.

To sum up, Secwepemctsin DPs headed by *re* differ from their counterparts in St'át'imcets. The former allows narrow scope and wide scope under negation and intensional operators, while in the latter wide scope interpretations are obligatory. This shows that the reference of Secwepemctsin DPs with *re* can depend on c-commanding operators. That is, these DPs can vary across the possible worlds over which intensional operators quantify. In contrast, the wide-scope interpretation of deictic DPs in St'át'imcets forces them to be evaluated outside the intensional contexts created by modals and *if*-clauses. Essentially, this means the Secwepemctsin determiner *re* can be interpreted *de dicto* and *de re*, whereas St'át'imcets deictic determiners are always interpreted *de re*.

### 5.3 Quantificational phrases

Since Secwepemctsin DPs headed by *re* can scope under negation and intensional operators, we predict transitive clauses to exhibit scope interactions between *re*-headed DPs and quantificational phrases. That is, distributive readings of DPs with *re* are expected to be possible.

Matthewson (1999) demonstrates that distributive readings of deictic indefinite DPs are unavailable in St'át'imcets. Transitive sentences with a singular indefinite DP and a quantificational DP are never interpreted distributively.<sup>20</sup> The St'át'imcets example in (34a) disallows a reading where a (potentially) different woman co-varies with each man in the extension of the DP modified by the quantifier *tákem* 'all'. That is, (34a) is rejected in a context where each man loves a different woman.

- (34) a. wa7-xwey-s-twítas                    [ta=smúlhats=a]    [tákem i=sqáyqeycw=a]  
 IPFV-be.dear-CAUS-3PL.ERG    D=woman=EXIS    all            D.PL=man(PL)=EXIS  
 'All (the) men love a woman.'

- b. *Consultant's comment*: "There's just one lady. Can't mean a different one each. It sounds like you're talking about that one lady."

(Matthewson 1999:97)

Crucially, the wide-scope interpretation of the indefinite DP in St'át'imcets is independent of the surface word order. Sentence (35a), with the quantificational phrase in clause-initial position, also doesn't exhibit a distributive interpretation.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup> There is an exception: constructions with a possessive pronoun in the DP. These can have a reading in which the pronoun is bound by the universal. That is, in these constructions, distributive readings are strictly related to the presence of pronouns. See Matthewson (1999) for a discussion of these special cases.

<sup>21</sup> Even in constructions involving pragmatically odd non-distributive readings, distributive interpretations are rejected, as illustrated in (ia–b).



- (35) a. [tákem i=sqáyqeycw=a] wa7-xwey-s-twítas [ta=smúlhats=a]  
 all D.PL =man(PL)=EXIS IPFV-be.dear-CAUS-3PL.ERG D=woman=EXIS  
 ‘All (the) men love a woman.’
- b. *Consultant’s comment:* “Still means there’s just one lady.”  
 (Matthewson 1999:97)

In Secwepemctsin, we predict that, contrary to St’át’imcets, constructions containing a quantificational subject DP and an object DP headed by *re* can receive a distributive interpretation. This prediction is borne out. Sentence (36a) is true in the context of Figure 2, where each of the four men is holding a different bottle. Paraphrase (36b) represents this reading in predicate logic.



Figure 2: Men holding bottles

- (36) a. [Xwexwéyt re sqelqélemcw] s-kwen-[n]t-és [re leputéy] C1/2  
 all D man.PL NMLZ-hold[CT]-TR-3PL D bottle  
 ‘All the men were holding a bottle.’
- b.  $\checkmark \forall x [\text{man}(x) \rightarrow \exists y [\text{bottle}(y) \wedge \text{hold}(y)(x)]]$

The same holds for sentence (37a). It can be used to describe the scene in Figure 3, in which each boat is attacked by a different fish.<sup>22</sup>

- (i) a. # [tákem i=sqáyqeycw=a] l-ti=tsítcw=a] melyih-s-as  
 all D.PL=man(PL)=EXIS in-D=house=D marry-CAUS-3ERG  
 [ti=emh-ál’qwem’=a syáqtsa7]  
 D=good-appear-EXIS woman  
 ‘All (the) men in our building married a beautiful woman.’

- b. *Consultant’s comment:* “Doesn’t make sense. How can they all marry one woman?”  
 (Matthewson 1999:97)

<sup>22</sup> Figure 3 depicts sharks. The consultant said that Secwepemctsin lacks a word for sharks, therefore we opted for sturgeon.



Figure 3: Boats attacked by fish

- (37) a. [xwexwéyt re xu7í] m-táxel-men-s [re cteqméwll] C1/2  
 all D sturgeon PFV-attack-RLT[-TR].3ERG D boat  
 ‘Every sturgeon attacked a boat.’
- b.  $\checkmark \forall x [\text{sturgeon}(x) \rightarrow \exists y [\text{boat}(y) \wedge \text{attack}(y)(x)]]$

Note that in (37b) the noun *xu7í* ‘sturgeon’ is not reduplicated, whereas the noun *sqelqélemcw* ‘men’ in (36b) is, which is the plural form of the noun. This shows that *xwexwéyt* ‘all’ can take either a singular (37b) or a plural DP (36b) as complement, and that both forms allow distributive readings.<sup>23</sup> We opted to use *every* in the English translation of sentence (37b) to indicate this difference, since the English *all* can only co-occur with plural nouns, whereas *every* can only co-occur with singular nouns.

We also identified that DPs with *re* have scope interactions with a temporal adjunct modified by *xwexwéyt* ‘every’. The individual(s) picked out by the DP *re kúkwi7* ‘a chief’ in sentence (38b) can co-vary with each day of the week, as illustrated in the storyboard in Figure 4.




1. On Monday Sander visited the chief of Kamloops



2. On Tuesday Sander visited the chief of Adams Lake

<sup>23</sup> Hannah Green (p.c.) points out that there are words that cannot be reduplicated for number. We did not test this explicitly for *xu7í*. However, there are independent examples in which *xwexwéyt* ‘all’ takes a singular DP, so our point remains.



3. On Wednesday Sander visited the chief of Simpcw



4. On Thursday Sander visited the chief of Skeetchestn



5. On Friday Sander visited the chief of Neskonlith

**Figure 4:** Sander visiting Secwépemc chiefs.

- (38) a. [Xwexwéyt te tsilkst te síqt] Sander tégwen-men-s [re kúkwpi7] C1  
 all D five D day Sander visit.-RLT[-CTR]-3ERG D chief  
 ‘All the five days Sander visited a chief.’

*Consultant’s comment:* “Yes, it does summarize the story.”

- b.  $\checkmark \forall x [\text{day-of-the-week}(x) \rightarrow \exists y [\text{chief}(y) \wedge \text{visit}(y) (\text{Sander})]]$

Moving on to inverse distributive readings, Matthewson (1999) shows that these readings are disallowed in St’át’imcets, which is illustrated in (39) and (40).

- (39) wa7-mitsaq-mín-as [ta=twíw’t=a] [i=n7án’was=a smelhmúlhats]  
 IPFV-sit-RLT-3ERG D=child=EXIS D.PL=two(HUM)=EXIS woman(PL)  
 ‘A child is sitting on two women.’

- i. Accepted in context: There is one child, who is sitting on two women’s laps.  
 ii. Rejected in context: A different child is sitting on each woman’s lap.

(Matthewson 1999:98)

- (40) paqw-al'ikst-min-ítas [i=nkekalhás=a sk'wemk'úk'wm'it]  
 look-leaf-RLT-3PL.ERG D.PL=three(HUM)=EXIS child(PL)  
 [tákem i=púkw=a]  
 D.PL =book=EXIS  
 'Three children read all (the) books.'

- i. Accepted in context: Three children together read all the books (e.g., "one could be reading it and the others could be listening, and they take turns").
- ii. Accepted in context: Three children between them read all the books.
- iii. Rejected in context: Three different children read each book.

(Matthewson 1999:99)

Secwepemctsin DPs headed by *re*, on the other hand, can yield an inverse-distributive interpretation. Sentence (41a), containing a quantificational phrase whose noun *tsrep* 'tree' is singular, is true in a scenario in which a different bird is sitting in each tree, pictured in Figure 5.



Figure 5: Birds in trees

- (41) a. ts-e7mút [re spyu7] [n-xwexwéyt te tsrep] C1/2  
 STAT-sit D bird PREP-all D tree  
 'A bird sits in every tree'
- b.  $\checkmark \forall x [\text{tree}(x) \rightarrow \exists y [\text{bird}(y) \wedge \text{sitting-in}(x)(y)]]$

The same type of distributive reading is displayed by sentence (42a), which can also be employed to describe picture Figure 3, repeated here.



Figure 3: Boats attacked by fishes

- (42) a. [re xu7ít] ts-clem-s [xwewéyt te cteqméwlls] C1/2  
 D sturgeon STAT-bite-3ERG all D boat  
 ‘A sturgeon is biting every boat.’

- b.  $\checkmark \forall x [\text{sturgeon}(x) \rightarrow \exists y [\text{boat}(y) \wedge \text{attack}(y)(x)]]$

The DP *re xu7ít* ‘a sturgeon’ in (42a) is referentially dependent on the quantificational phrase *xwewéyt te cteqméwlls* ‘every boat’. That is, the former co-varies with each boat in the extension of the latter. The predicate logic paraphrases in (42b) captures this interpretation.<sup>24</sup>

One final data point that provides evidence for inverse distributive readings of *re*-headed DPs comes from a sentence in which a DP with *re* is contained within a larger subject DP. In sentence (43b), this DP is formed by the conjunction of the proper name *Alan* and the DP *re núxwenxw* ‘a woman’. Sentence (43b) was accepted as a description of picture (43a), i.e., where a different woman helped Alan to carry each one of the tables.




Figure 6: Alan and a woman carry tables

- (43) a. [Alan ell re núxwenxw] úke-n[t]-s [xwexwéyt re letletép] C1  
 Alan and D woman carry-CTR[-TR]-3ERG all D table.PL  
 ‘Alan and a woman carried all the tables.’

<sup>24</sup> Figures 1, 2, 3, and 5 are from The Scope Fieldwork Project (Bruening 2008).

- b.  $\checkmark \forall x [\text{table}(x) \rightarrow \exists y [\text{woman}(y) \wedge \text{carry}(x)(\text{Alan} \oplus y)]]$

The DP *re núxwenxw* ‘a woman’ within the subject argument co-varies with each table in the extension of the quantificational phrase *xwexwéyt re letletép* ‘all the tables’ in object position.

To summarize, we have shown Secwepemctsin DPs headed by *re* allow non-inverse and inverse distributive readings. These facts show that DPs headed by the determiner *re* can be referentially dependent on quantificational phrases occurring in the same clause whether as arguments or as adjuncts. Such a dependency can hold of subject and object DP arguments. These findings are strikingly different from what has been reported about indefinite DPs in St’át’imcets by Matthewson (1996, 1998, 1999).

## 6 Variation between the two determiner systems and future research

The comparison between the determiner *re* in Secwepemctsin and its counterparts in St’át’imcets reveals further variations between determiner systems in Salish. Matthewson (1996, 1998, 1999) shows that St’át’imcets encodes a clear division of semantic labour between the assertion-of-existence determiners on the one hand, and a determiner that does not assert existence on the other. Under Matthewson’s analysis, assertion-of-existence has a “speaker-orientated nature”. DPs headed by assertion-of-existence determiners are used when the speaker wishes to assert that the set denoted by the nominal expression complement of the determiner is not empty. Contrary to presupposed content, the asserted content need not be shared by the listener for a sentence to be felicitous. In other words, (existential) propositions asserted by any of these determiners do not need to be in the set of propositions commonly believed by the speaker and hearer (*the common ground*). Moreover, assertion-of-existence forces DPs to be interpreted outside the scope of negation and intensional operators. That is why predicate logic paraphrases of sentences in which an assertion-of-existence DP co-occurs with a semantic operator always have the form  $\exists x [P(x) \wedge \dots Op \dots (x) \dots]$ . Conversely, since the St’át’imcets determiner *ku* does not assert existence, it is always interpreted within the non-factual and intensional contexts created by these operators. In fact, Matthewson argues that *ku* is a polarity determiner licensed by negation, question words, modals, intensional verbs, and *if*-clauses. The general picture that emerges is of a determiner system that leaves no room for ambiguity: wide-scope interpretation is unique to assertion-of-existence determiners, while the narrow-scope reading is strictly reserved for *ku*.

Overall, Matthewson claims that there are two types of determiners that do not access the common ground: assertion-of-existence determiners, namely the deictic ones in St’át’imcets, and one that neither asserts nor presupposes existence, i.e., the determiner *ku*. Based on her findings in St’át’imcets, Matthewson hypothesizes that all determiner systems in Salish encode the distinction between assertion-of-existence and non-assertion of existence and lack presuppositional determiners.

Nevertheless, our findings so far about *re* show that this division of labour in Secwepemctsin is not as transparent as in St’át’imcets. The Secwepemctsin determiner *re* has the following set of semantic features that are not associated with assertion-of-existence determiners.

- (i) Allows temporally free interpretation (TFI) and individual concept reading (ICR).
- (ii) Can have wide and narrow scope with respect to non-factual/intensional operators.
- (iii) Is able to have narrow scope with respect to a quantificational phrase.
- (iv) Is accepted in contexts that require presupposition cancelling.

Based on our findings in Secwepemctsin, we introduce some preliminary generalizations about the Secwepemctsin determiner system. We propose that *re* is an unmarked determiner. In the determiner system of Secwepemctsin this means that *re* does not encode deictic features, assertion, or non-assertion of existence. The unmarked nature of *re* explains its broad range of available uses and interpretations.

We currently do not have evidence suggesting that the other Secwepemctsin determiners are also different from the St'at'imcets determiners with respect to assertion and non-assertion of existence — this is yet to be tested. Therefore, we preliminarily suggest that Secwepemctsin has the determiner inventory given in Table 3.

**Table 3:** Revised determiner inventory of Secwepemctsin

	Unmarked	Assertion-of-existence	Non-assertion
<b>Absolutive</b>	<i>re</i>	<i>le</i>	<i>k</i>
<b>Relative/oblique</b>		<i>te</i>	<i>tek</i>

We suggest that Secwepemctsin has one unmarked determiner (*re*), a set of assertion-of-existence determiners (*le*, *te*), and a set of non-assertion-of-existence determiners (*k*, *tek*).

The variations across determiner systems in Salish discussed in this paper can indicate the existence of a continuum. On one extreme of the spectrum, we have St'at'imcets, which exhibits an exhaustive division of labor between assertion-of-existence and non-assertion-of-existence determiners. On the other end of the spectrum, we find Nsyilxcən, which has only one determiner. Lyon (2011) demonstrates that this single determiner does not encode deictic features and assertion-of-existence, and, consequently, allows narrow and wide scope with respect to non-factual operators. Then, in between, there is Secwepemctsin, which, up to now, seems to have a determiner inventory that encompasses properties exhibited by the systems of both languages. We believe that recent and future findings of the ongoing research agenda on semantic variations across determiner systems in Salish will lead to a better understanding of the range of the determiner continuum, and whether there is a prevalent determiner system in Salish.

## 7 Conclusion

In this conclusion we suggest a number of avenues that need to be explored in future research on Secwepemctsin determiners. Firstly, more research is needed on the available scope interactions of the determiner *re*. So far, we have sufficient evidence that shows that *re* can take wide and narrow scope with respect to negation, intensional operators, and quantificational phrases. However, it is yet unclear what are the available scope interpretations of *re* in sentences whose arguments are plural DPs without the universal *xwexwéyt*. It's also crucial, in order to map all its scope abilities, to investigate if *re* can take intermediate scope.

Secondly, the division of labour between *re* and the hypothetical determiner *k* needs to be explored further. This paper has shown that *re* can occur in the environments of the hypothetical determiner *k*, which entails that *k* is not obligatory in these environments, contrary to the situation in St'at'imcets, where only *ku* can occur under the scope of intensional operators. Thus, although *k* and *tek* can be licensed by non-factual operators, this is not obligatory. In order to better understand the hypothetical determiners, and the division of labor between them and *re*, we need

to investigate the syntactic environment(s) in which *k* and *tek* are obligatory, and those in which they are optional, and to explore what these facts tell us about their semantics.

Thirdly, more work is needed to investigate whether DPs with *re*, like corresponding DPs with deictic determiners in St'át'imcets, allow coreference with pronouns even when they are interpreted as non-specific. One crucial finding of Matthewson's works is the fact that St'át'imcets assertion-of-existence determiners do not encode specificity. On the assumption that specific readings of indefinite DPs emerge when speakers have a particular individual(s) in mind, which they can identify if needed (Enç 1991; Ionin 2006; Ioup 1977; Ludlow & Neale 1991; Kamp & Reyle 1993, among others), Matthewson (1996:72) shows that non-specific interpretations of assertion-of-existence DPs "occur when the speaker believes in the existence of a unique individual, but may not be able to actually identify that individual". More strikingly, a non-specific assertion-of-existence DP is able to co-refer with a pronoun introduced in the subsequent clause. That is, assertion-of-existence determiners can be interpreted as specific or non-specific indefinites, and in both uses, coreference with a pronoun is possible. This is not a distinguishing ability of specific indefinites, as was widely believed before the works of Matthewson. Therefore, since it is still not clear whether *re*-headed DPs allow non-specific wide scope readings with respect to intensional operators, doing further tests on *re*-headed DPs can inform us more about the semantics of coreference and scope interactions of *re*. Moreover, recall that *re* is felicitous in a case that induces presupposition cancelling, unlike assertion-of-existence determiners. This piece of evidence, if strengthened by other related facts — such as presupposition accommodation, obligatory specific readings of wide scope of *re* — can support a different analysis of *re*. It may end up that *re*, like the English indefinite *a(n)*, is ambiguous between specific and non-specific indefinites (Fodor & Sag 1982; Ludlow & Neale 1991; Kratzer 1998). If this turns out to be the case, it can be argued that in its specific interpretation *re* triggers the presupposition that the set denoted by the NP is non-empty (Enç 1991; Ludlow & Neale 1991). This would have broad consequences for determiner variation across Salish languages, since *re* would be able to access the common ground.

Fourth, it needs to be tested which determiners in Secwepemctsin encode deictic features and assert existence. We predict that the determiners encoding these properties disallow TFIs and ICRs and force wide-scope readings with regards to negation, intensional operators, and quantificational phrases. However, this prediction has not yet been tested, and further research is needed.

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